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A DECISION THEORY APPROACH TO THE BUSINESS
JUDGMENT RULE: REFLECTIONS ON DISNEY, GOOD
FAITH, AND JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY
ANDREW S. GOLD*
ABSTRACT
This Article presents an institutional choice perspective on the
judicial role in enforcing corporate law, in light of the Delaware Su-
preme Court’s recent formulation of a fiduciary duty of good faith.
The court’s Disney decision allows for the possibility that director
decisions will be reviewed under a more stringent standard of review
than the traditional business judgment rule (the doctrine that courts
will refuse to second-guess the substantive judgments of unconflicted
corporate directors).  This Article argues that shifting the standard of
review could dramatically alter the courts’ role in policing board mis-
conduct.  Furthermore, it shows that courts do not have access to
sufficient empirical data to calculate an ideal balance between board
accountability and board authority.  It is impossible to reliably weigh
the complex variables that are relevant to this balance.  Given this
uncertainty, this Article then uses decision theory to suggest that the
business judgment rule standard—a rational basis test—is the most
reasonable means for courts to review unconflicted director conduct.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Michael Ovitz was hired as president of the Walt Disney
Company.1  Regrettably, his presidency was not a successful one, and
in December 1996, Ovitz’s employment was terminated.2  It is not the
termination itself, but its consequences, that were controversial.
Ovitz’s firing resulted in a severance package valued at approximately
$130 million, yet he had worked for Disney for a mere fourteen
months.3  Even by Hollywood standards, $130 million was a lot of
money for barely a year of work.
This rather large payment did not sit well with shareholders, and
it led to a highly public lawsuit in the Delaware courts, seeking relief
from the Disney board of directors.4  After a thirty-seven-day trial, the
plaintiffs lost their case:5 they were unable to prevail on claims under
1. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) (en
banc).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.  The plaintiffs brought claims based on the Disney board’s hiring of Ovitz under
such a lucrative contract, as well as the decision to give him a not-for-cause termination,
which affected the severance Ovitz received. Id. at 46, 68.
5. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 907 A.2d 693, 697 (Del. Ch.
2005).
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the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, or good faith.6  An important doc-
trinal development emerged in the process.  In ruling against the
shareholder plaintiffs, the Delaware courts provided guidance on the
meaning of a corporate director’s duty to act in good faith.  Until
now, the meaning of the fiduciary duty of good faith has been an
open question.7
The Disney litigation thus represents a pivotal moment for fiduci-
ary doctrine.  On June 8, 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed
the chancery court’s finding that the Disney board did not breach its
duties of care and good faith.8  But rather than impose an objective
standard of good faith conduct, the court endorsed the view that a
breach of the duty of good faith occurs when a director engages in an
“intentional dereliction of duty, [or] a conscious disregard for one’s
responsibilities.”9  As a result, the existence of good or bad faith acts
depends on a director’s subjective state of mind.10  A director with a
6. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 35 (concluding that the chancery court’s findings that
there were no breaches of fiduciary duty or corporate waste were correct); Brehm v. Eisner
(Disney II), 746 A.2d 244, 267 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (affirming the chancery court’s dismis-
sal of loyalty claims with prejudice).
7. See Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 753–54 (describing case law outlining the fiduciary duty of
good faith as a “fog of . . . hazy jurisprudence”).  Within the past few years, commentators
have produced a substantial body of literature attempting to explain the good faith doc-
trine. See Christopher M. Bruner, “Good Faith,” State of Mind, and the Outer Boundaries of
Director Liability in Corporate Law (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 05-19,
2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=832944; Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good
Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2006); Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business
Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005); Claire
Hill & Brett  McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias (Minn. Legal Studies Re-
search Paper No. 06-46), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=929488; Elizabeth Nowicki,
The Unimportance of Being Earnest: Reflections on Director Liability and Good Faith (Aug. 1, 2006)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=921668; John L. Reed &
Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of Directors to Assert Section 102(b)(7) of the Dela-
ware General Corporation Law as a Defense to Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and
Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111 (2004); David Rosenberg, Making
Sense of Good Faith in Delaware Corporate Fiduciary Law: A Contractarian Approach, 29 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 491 (2004); Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004);
E. Norman Veasey & Christine T. Di Guglielmo, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law
and Governance from 1992–2004?  A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
1399, 1439–54 (2005).
8. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 28, 35.
9. Id. at 66; see id. at 66–67 (concluding that such conduct is “properly treated” as a
violation of the duty to act in good faith and “uphold[ing] the Court of Chancery’s defini-
tion as a legally appropriate, although not the exclusive, definition of fiduciary bad faith”).
10. But see Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 72 (suggesting that this definition of bad faith R
does not require that a “manager was subjectively conscious that he was disregarding his
duties”); Sale, supra note 7, at 493 (“Although a breach of good faith need not be inten- R
tional or conscious, it does require some sort of obvious, deliberate, or egregious failure.”).
The court’s decision also leaves open some possibility of additional meanings for good
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pure heart and an empty head would seemingly not be liable under
this formulation.11
Yet defining good faith does not resolve its place in litigation.  In
corporate law, questions of good faith intersect with the business judg-
ment rule.12  Under current formulations of the business judgment
rule, courts refuse to second-guess a director’s decision “unless the
directors are interested or lack independence[,] . . . do not act in
good faith, act in a manner that cannot be attributed to a rational
business purpose or reach their decision by a grossly negligent pro-
cess.”13  In practice, the business judgment rule carves out a large
swath of director conduct which is unreviewable by the judicial system,
unless plaintiffs can demonstrate a conflict of interest or that the
board’s conduct is so irrational that it could not have been motivated
by a legitimate business purpose.14
In recent years, commentators have looked to good faith as a
means to challenge traditional understandings of the business judg-
ment rule.15  For example, an objective test for bad faith conduct
could mean that well-meaning, but egregious, business judgments trig-
ger liability.  This, in turn, would be a major inroad on the courts’
typical refusal to second-guess directors’ substantive business judg-
ments.16  Limiting bad faith claims to cases where there is a conscious
faith, as it notes that the chancery court definition that it upheld is “not the exclusive”
definition. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67.
11. Although controversial, this result has a long pedigree. See, e.g., Barnes v. Andrews,
298 F. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) (“Directors are not specialists . . . .  They are the general
advisers of the business, and if they faithfully give such ability as they have to their charge,
it would not be lawful to hold them liable.  Must a director guarantee that his judgment is
good?”).
12. See Griffith, supra note 7, at 15 (suggesting that a distinct duty of good faith may R
implicate “a new standard under the business judgment rule and thereby realign[ ] the
balance between authority and accountability in corporate law jurisprudence”).
13. Disney II, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (en banc).
14. See William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due Care with
Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and Its Progeny as a Standard of Review Prob-
lem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 452 (2002) (“[T]he business judgment review standard (‘ration-
ality’) diverges from, and becomes more lenient than, the normative standard of conduct
(‘reasonableness’).”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doc-
trine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 99–100 (2004) (suggesting that, under the standard described in
Disney II, “[a]bsent self dealing or other conflicted interests, or truly egregious process
failures, the court will abstain”).
15. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 7, at 494 (suggesting that “[t]he value of a separate good R
faith duty . . . is in its potential for addressing those outrageous and egregious abdications
of fiduciary behavior that are not simply the results of bad process or conflicts”).
16. Cf. Griffith, supra note 7, at 32 (suggesting that reviewing board conduct for “reck- R
lessness or intentional disregard is merely to conduct the negligence inquiry under an-
other label”); id. at 33 (“[I]f this standard seeks to apply a test other than gross negligence
or waste, it is inconsistent with the business judgment rule.”).
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disregard of known duties, on the other hand, suggests a more limited
judicial role.17
After the Disney decision, the meaning of a fiduciary’s duty of
good faith has been substantially clarified.  Good faith is now identi-
fied with a subjective intent to further the best interests of the corpo-
ration.18  What remains to be decided is how courts will review a
claimed breach of good faith.19  The content of good faith does not
tell us how courts should review director decisions, or how to recog-
nize a conscious disregard of a director’s responsibilities.  As will be
developed below, the business judgment rule approach—a rational
basis test—is the best available method for reviewing an unconflicted
board’s conduct for compliance with the duty of good faith.20
In addressing the duty of good faith, this Article will provide a
new justification for business judgment rule protections.21  Given the
17. But cf. id. at 33 (claiming that “moving good faith to a substantive standard of intent
does not avoid repetition of duty-of-care analytics and, ultimately, confrontation with the
business judgment rule”).
18. See Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (en banc) (discussing good faith require-
ments in terms of the chancery court’s description of “a true faithfulness and devotion to
the interests of the corporation and its shareholders” (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 755
(Del. Ch. 2005))).
19. Lower courts have provided some guidance using this definition of subjective bad
faith conduct. See, e.g., Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755 (“The presumption of the business judg-
ment rule creates a presumption that a director acted in good faith.  In order to overcome
that presumption, a plaintiff must prove an act of bad faith by a preponderance of the
evidence.”); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v.
Elkins, No. Civ. A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *17 n.92 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004)
(indicating that “[i]n the case of an alleged breach of fiduciary duty for intentionally and
consciously disregarding one’s duties of faithfulness and care, the Court will focus on
whether the Board’s process is irrational”).
20. This form of rationality review is highly deferential to the board.  As Stephen Bain-
bridge notes, “[e]ven the reference to a rational business purpose requires only the possi-
bility that the decision was actuated by a legitimate business reason, not that directors must
prove the existence of such a reason.”  Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 100; see also Allen et al., R
supra note 14, at 452 (describing an irrational decision as “one that is so blatantly impru- R
dent that it is inexplicable, in the sense that no well-motivated and minimally informed
person could have made it”).  In some cases, a different standard for determining bad faith
may make sense, as in situations where there is a failure to act. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l
Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968–70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (describing good faith require-
ments in context of an unconsidered board failure to act); see also Stone v. Ritter, No. 93,
2006 WL 3169168, at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006) (adopting the Caremark standard for bad faith
liability for cases where “directors knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary
obligations”).
21. For recent explanations of the business judgment rule, see Allen et al., supra note
14, at 452–53; Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Once More, the Business Judgment Rule, 2000 WIS. L. REV. R
573; Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and Standards of Review in
Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 440–45 (1993); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Business
Judgment Rule: Meaningless Verbiage or Misguided Notion?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 287 (1994);
Lyman Johnson, The Modest Business Judgment Rule, 55 BUS. LAW. 625 (2000); Jeremy
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empirical uncertainty that surrounds debates over the ideal level of
board accountability, a rational basis test is appropriate to police the
board’s subjective failings and improper motivations.  This is not be-
cause it is firmly established that courts are poor decisionmakers com-
pared to boards.22  Rather, an optimal allocation of corporate
decisionmaking authority requires an institutional choice to be made
with inadequate information.
In the case of business judgments, courts must decide who de-
cides.23  This selection among institutions is unavoidable: to the ex-
tent courts actively review a board’s decisions, they effectively supplant
the board’s decisionmaking authority.24  The role of courts in review-
ing business judgments should therefore be assessed in light of a com-
parative institutional analysis, taking into account the costs and
benefits of boards, courts, and shareholders as decisionmakers.25  But
due to the complexity of this comparison, and the limited information
available, this is not an analysis that can be adequately made in the
near term, if ever.26
Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure and Executive Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=895548.
22. There are, however, courts and commentators that suggest this view. See, e.g.,
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (“[W]e do not mean to say
that we have decided that the decision of the directors was a correct one.  That is beyond
our jurisdiction and ability.”); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich. 1919)
(refusing to intervene in a decision to expand a business, and noting that “[t]he judges are
not business experts”); cf. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 119 (noting that “bounded rational- R
ity and information asymmetries counsel judicial abstention from reviewing board deci-
sions”).  On the other hand, Delaware courts have significant business expertise.  Id. at
120–21; Telman, supra note 21, at 14. R
23. See Wayne O. Hanewicz, Director Primacy, Omnicare, and the Function of Corporate
Law, 71 TENN. L. REV. 511, 511 (2004) (“[C]orporate law does and should allocate deci-
sion-making authority to various institutions, such as the board, the shareholders, and the
judiciary, and . . . this decision-making authority ought to be allocated so as to most effi-
ciently advance the ultimate goal of corporate law.”); see also Bainbridge, supra note 14, at R
121 (“Neither courts nor boards are infallible, but someone must be final.  Otherwise, we
end up with a never-ending process of appellate review.  The question then is simply who is
better suited to be vested with the mantle of infallibility that comes by virtue of being
final—directors or judges?”).
24. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 108 (recognizing that the power to hold the board R
accountable “is ultimately the power to decide” and that “the board cannot be made more
accountable without shifting some of its decision-making authority to shareholders or
judges”).
25. See, e.g., Hanewicz, supra note 23, at 520 (indicating that decisionmaking should be R
assigned to a variety of institutions and that “[a]uthority should be vested in a given institu-
tion only if that institution is best suited to furthering shareholder wealth maximization”).
26. As will be developed below, certain institutional comparisons raise “trans-scientific”
empirical questions—questions which cannot readily be assessed in the near term at ac-
ceptable cost, and perhaps not in the long term. See infra notes 331–336 and accompany- R
ing text.
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Many empirical questions arise.  Would shareholder wealth be
maximized in the long run if courts defer to fewer board judgments
under the business judgment rule?  How common are judicial errors
when courts review board decisions?  How often do directors acting in
good faith reach incorrect decisions?  Are directors substantially less
likely to engage in profitable risk-taking if they face increased judicial
scrutiny under the duty of good faith?  It is unclear what the answers
to these questions are, or even how these factors should be weighed in
allocating institutional authority.  The necessary empirical data is sim-
ply unavailable.
A choice must nevertheless be made, despite the difficulty of as-
sessing outcomes under different allocations of decisionmaking au-
thority.27  Fortunately, courts can do more than just guess at the right
allocation of authority.  Recent scholarship has suggested an ap-
proach to resolving this type of uncertainty in the context of judicial
review of federal statutes.28
Decision theory examines how rational actors make decisions sub-
ject to constraints.29  Techniques adapted from decision theory can
address hard problems of institutional choice.30  For example, under
the “principle of insufficient reason,” a decisionmaker assumes that
unknown or speculative costs and benefits will cancel out.31  By focus-
ing on those factors which are known, or at least readily knowable, it is
possible to make the best of intractable uncertainty.32  This principle,
among others, permits decisions to be made without resorting to ran-
dom guesses or raw intuition.
27. For a helpful analysis of decisionmaking under conditions of severe uncertainty,
see JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGEMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF RATIONALITY
10–13 (1989).  As Elster notes, when making such choices there are a number of potential
unknowns: the available options, the possible outcomes under each option, the value of
each outcome, and the probability of each outcome. Id. at 134.
28. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 1 (2006) [hereinafter VERMEULE, JUDGING] (proposing a limited
role for judicial review based upon problems of severe uncertainty when comparing the
relevant institutions); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 78 (2000)
[hereinafter Vermeule, Interpretive Choice] (offering “methods of interpretive choice under
conditions of severe empirical uncertainty”); see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule,
Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV. 885, 885–86 (2003) (emphasizing the im-
portance of an institutional choice analysis in debates over statutory interpretation).
29. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 171; see also James P. Spica, The Rationality of R
Normative Expectations, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 259, 277 (1998) (“Decision theory is the normative
theory of rational choice under uncertainty.”).
30. See infra notes 349–368 and accompanying text. R
31. See infra notes 349–354 and accompanying text. R
32. See VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 174 (“[I]n such situations decisionmakers R
do not retreat into paralysis.  Rather, they eliminate imponderables from both sides of the
scales and focus instead on the variables that can be grasped.”).
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Strategies for decisionmaking under severe uncertainty point to-
ward a minimal judicial role in cases that implicate substantive busi-
ness judgments.  Although many of the important factors for
allocating decisionmaking authority in this context are matters of con-
jecture, some can be assessed.  High decision costs counsel against
creating new exceptions to the business judgment rule.33  These
known costs, along with a reasonable desire to limit worst case scena-
rios, suggest that courts should leave the business judgment rule
unchanged.
The initial sections of this Article provide a doctrinal analysis of
the Disney decisions and their implications.  Part II will set forth the
three basic fiduciary duties in corporate law: the duties of care, loyalty,
and good faith, while Part III will review the facts and decisional his-
tory leading up to the recent denial of the Disney plaintiffs’ claims.
Part IV describes the Delaware Supreme Court’s conception of
the duty of good faith and analyzes its doctrinal implications.  This
Part will show that the Delaware Supreme Court has adopted a subjec-
tive standard for bad faith conduct, grounded in a director’s con-
scious disregard of her responsibilities.  This Part also demonstrates
that the standard of review for claims of bad faith conduct is still
unclear.
The remaining sections of the Article will suggest that the appro-
priate standard when reviewing director conduct for bad faith is a ra-
tionality test.  Though it is natural to be concerned that the business
judgment rule could be overly protective of directors at the expense
of shareholders, it does not follow that a more expansive judicial role
would actually benefit shareholders.  As will be developed, a rational-
ity test responds to severe limitations of judicial knowledge.
Part V of this Article assesses the duty of good faith with respect
to business judgment rule protections, and it indicates that an analysis
of board conduct under a more stringent standard of review would
pose a substantial risk of judicial error.  Both the subject matter and
the legal standards involved are highly indeterminate.
Part VI then considers judicial review of director good faith as a
matter of comparative institutional analysis.  Courts should compare
different decisionmaking institutions when determining the appropri-
ate balance of board accountability and board authority.  Using princi-
ples adapted from decision theory, this Part concludes that the most
reasonable institutional choice, given severe empirical uncertainty,
calls for a protective form of the business judgment rule.
33. See infra notes 406–413 and accompanying text. R
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II. THE DUTIES OF CARE, LOYALTY, AND GOOD FAITH
Delaware courts describe three primary fiduciary obligations: the
duties of care, loyalty, and good faith.34  While the duties of care and
loyalty are well established, the jurisprudence of good faith is in its
early stages.  Good faith has been described as a bridge between the
other two duties.35  All three are interrelated, yet they play distinct
roles in corporate governance.36
A. The Duty of Care
The duty of care requires the manager of a business to reach de-
cisions using the amount of care that people of ordinary prudence
would use under similar circumstances, and to consider all material
information that is reasonably available.37  Issues of care typically im-
plicate the process by which a business decision is reached, rather
than the substantive decision itself.38  Claims that the duty of care has
been breached are generally reviewed for gross negligence.39
34. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (“The directors of
Delaware corporations have a triad of primary fiduciary duties: due care, loyalty, and good
faith.”); Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) (same); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (same).
35. See Reed & Neiderman, supra note 7, at 123 (“The ‘good faith’ standard, especially R
in the abdication context . . . acts almost as a bridge between the concepts of due care and
loyalty, transforming what might otherwise be deemed certain violations of the former into
violations of the latter, even in the absence of an adverse pecuniary interest.”).
36. See Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 745–46 (Del. Ch. 2005) (indicating that “issues of good
faith are . . . inseparably and necessarily intertwined with the duties of care and loyalty”).
Sean Griffith explains:
Whether the question is confronted from the perspective of the duty of care or of
the duty of loyalty is just a difference in approach.  To put it another way, the
fundamental question underlying both duties really is good faith.  Are the direc-
tors doing their best in acting for someone else?
Griffith, supra note 7, at 43. R
37. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872–73 (Del. 1985) (en banc) (describing
the duty of care as “a director’s duty to exercise an informed business judgment”); In re
Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968 (Del. Ch. 1996) (defining the duty
of care inquiry as “whether there was good faith effort to be informed and exercise judg-
ment”).  The duty may also apply in cases where the fiduciary acts contrary to the interests
of the business entity, but does not actually act out of self-interest. See D. Gordon Smith,
The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1410–11 (2002) (“While
any action that harms the beneficiary might in some sense constitute a breach of loyalty,
courts typically reserve the label ‘loyalty’ for self-interested actions.  Actions that advantage
a third party at the expense of the beneficiary are usually treated as a breach of the duty of
care.”).
38. See Disney II, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (“Due care in the decision-
making context is process due care only.”).
39. See Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 749 (“[D]eficiencies in the directors’ process are actiona-
ble only if the directors’ actions are grossly negligent.”).
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B. The Duty of Loyalty
The fiduciary duty of loyalty is sometimes described as a duty of
unselfishness.40  An important component of conventional duty of loy-
alty claims is that they involve material conflicts of interest, typically
based on financial benefits.41  Some loyalty cases do not involve direc-
tor conflicts of interest, but this element is often required for a suc-
cessful cause of action.42  In court, when a material conflict of interest
is demonstrated, the burden of proof shifts to the defendants, who
must show the entire fairness of their actions.43
C. The Duty of Good Faith
Although good faith has long been required of directors, as a dis-
tinct fiduciary analysis it is a recent arrival,44 and its meaning is notori-
ously vague.45  Furthermore, the doctrine may have different
meanings in different contexts.46  Some question whether a fiduciary
duty of good faith is not simply equivalent to the implied contractual
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a fiduciary setting.47  Al-
40. See, e.g., Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (“The rule that requires an
undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there be no conflict be-
tween duty and self-interest.”).
41. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 751.
42. The Delaware Supreme Court’s recent Stone decision clarifies that bad faith claims
implicate a more expansive view of the duty of loyalty. See Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL
3169168, at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006) (“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases
involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest.”); cf. Guttman v.
Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (indicating that the underlying motive for
conscious actions not in the corporation’s best interest does not make such actions
faithful).
43. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (describing the entire
covenanthe 276monstrated16
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though good faith is a longstanding feature of contract law, there is
reason to think that good faith for fiduciaries means something more.
Until recently, the Delaware Supreme Court apparently viewed
the duty of good faith as a freestanding fiduciary duty, independent
from the duties of loyalty or care.48  One proposed explanation for
this distinction was that the duty of good faith covers instances where
a fiduciary acts egregiously, abdicating her obligations in ways that im-
plicate more than gross negligence, but without meeting the tradi-
tional loyalty test for conflicts of interest.49  For example, where a
director recklessly misleads shareholders, yet lacks a conflict of inter-
est, he might breach his fiduciary duty of good faith.50
The Delaware Supreme Court’s announcement of a triad of inde-
pendent duties met resistance from the Delaware chancery courts.51
One court expressly concluded that the duty of good faith “does not
exist separate and apart from the fiduciary duty of loyalty.”52  Under
this view, a fiduciary cannot simultaneously act in bad faith and loyally
[p]roperly construed, good faith is not itself a fiduciary duty, nor is it a subset of a
specific fiduciary duty.  Rather, good faith is an interpretive device which can be
used to determine whether directors have adhered to their traditional fiduciary
duties of loyalty and care.  This application of the term is analogous to its use in
interpreting adherence to contractual duties.
Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 515. R
48. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (recognizing a
“triad” of fiduciary duties including the duty of good faith).  It is now clear that the duty of
good faith is a subsidiary duty to the duty of loyalty. See Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL
3169168, at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006) (“The failure to act in good faith may result in liability
because the requirement to act in good faith ‘is [already] a subsidiary element,’ i.e., a
condition, ‘of the fundamental duty of loyalty.’” (quoting Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d
492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003))); see also id. (“[A]lthough good faith may be described
colloquially as part of a ‘triad’ of fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loy-
alty, the obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent fiduciary duty
that stands on the same footing as the duties of care and loyalty.” (footnote omitted)).
49. See Sale, supra note 7, at 494 (“The value of a separate good faith duty, then, is in its R
potential for addressing those outrageous and egregious abdications of fiduciary behavior
that are not simply the results of bad process or conflicts.”).
50. See id.  However, Sale’s definition of good faith arguably depends upon the content
of the duties of loyalty and care.  Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 509 (indicating for support R
that Sale contends that a failure to attempt to comply with one’s fiduciary duties is likely to
result in a breach of good faith).
51. See, e.g., In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 475 n.41 (Del.
Ch. 2000) (contending that the Supreme Court’s formulation was a “fresh way of referring
to the ‘fundamental duties of care and loyalty’”); Rosenberg, supra note 7, at 500–05 R
(describing lower courts’ reluctance to accept good faith as anything more than a subset of
the duty of loyalty).
52. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, No. Civ. A. 9700, 2001 WL 115340, at *25 n.63 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 7, 2001) (citing In re Gaylord Container Corp., 753 A.2d at 475 n.41), vacated, 787 A.2d
85 (Del. 2001) .
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toward the corporation and its stockholders.53  Another chancery
court opinion explained that “[i]f it is useful at all as an independent
concept,” the good faith duty makes clear that a fiduciary may act dis-
loyally even in circumstances where the fiduciary does not have a fi-
nancial interest in the transaction at issue.54
On November 6, 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court conceded
the point and explained in Stone v. Ritter55 that the duty of good faith
is in fact a subsidiary duty, linked to the duty of loyalty.56  The court
clarified that liability based on bad faith is indirect—a failure to act in
good faith does not directly result in the imposition of liability.57  In-
stead, the duty of loyalty should be understood to include contexts
where fiduciaries fail to act in good faith, even though the fiduciaries
may not have pecuniary or other cognizable conflicts of interest.58
Whether it is conceptualized as a subset of loyalty or its own inde-
pendent duty, however, good faith is an amorphous concept.59  Good
faith is commonly understood to require that directors act with “hon-
esty of purpose,” in pursuit of the corporation’s best interests.60  Based
on recent precedent, commentators have contended that good faith
includes an objective element, including duties grounded in norms of
corporate conduct.61  Commentators have also suggested severe reck-
lessness as a touchstone for violations of the duty.62  Others argue that
53. See id.; cf. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 41 (Del. Ch. 2002) (maintaining that a
failure to reveal material facts can implicate all three fiduciary duties); see also Guttman, 823
A.2d at 506 n.34 (stating that “there is no case in which a director can act in subjective bad
faith towards the corporation and act loyally”).
54. Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000).
55. No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006).
56. See id. at *6 (explaining that a breach of the duty of good faith is a violation of the
duty of loyalty).
57. See id. (“[A] failure to act in good faith is not conduct that results, ipso facto, in the
direct imposition of fiduciary liability.”).
58. See id. (“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited to cases involving a financial or
other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest.”).
59. See supra notes 45–46 and accompanying text. R
60. See Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 753 (Del. Ch. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting E. Norman Veasey, Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional Responsibilities of Corpo-
rate Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, 12 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2003)).
61. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 24 (arguing that “the objective elements of good R
faith are far more important in practice than the subjective elements” and that a director
may have violated the duty of good faith through the use of a manipulative process that
violates “generally accepted basic corporate norms”).
62. See Sale, supra note 7, at 489 (discussing cases in which a breach of the duty of good R
faith “requires motive-based allegations of severely reckless or seemingly intentional
behavior”).
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bad faith conduct must be linked to the existence of improper motiva-
tions or illicit intent.63
As Chancellor Chandler recently noted, the duty of good faith
has been shrouded in a “fog of . . . hazy jurisprudence.”64  This fog was
the backdrop for the Delaware Supreme Court’s resolution of the Dis-
ney case.
III. THE HISTORY OF THE DISNEY LITIGATION
The following Section provides a summary of the Disney V opin-
ion’s description of undisputed facts surrounding Michael Ovitz’s hir-
ing and firing, as well as a review of the procedural history leading to
the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent decision.  For an in-depth analy-
sis of the evidence presented in the case, the reader is encouraged to
review the chancery court’s exhaustive post-trial opinion.65
A. The Facts of the Disney Case
The Ovitz severance from Disney concluded an unhappy episode
in Disney’s history.  Initially, Ovitz’s hiring appeared to be an answer
to Disney’s hopes for a strong second in command.  The fit, however,
was not a good one.  Ovitz’s employment turned out to be a major
mistake, ending some fourteen months later with a severance pay-
ment that was valued at approximately $130 million.66
Disney’s need for a new president came about when the corpora-
tion suffered several misfortunes.  First came the untimely death of its
President, Frank Wells, in a fatal 1994 helicopter crash.67  Michael Eis-
ner, the corporation’s chairman, was able to step into the role.68  But
shortly thereafter, Eisner was diagnosed with heart disease, and under-
went quadruple bypass surgery.69  The Disney board consequently dis-
cussed the need to identify a successor for Eisner.70
Eisner supported Michael Ovitz for the position.71  Ovitz was a
longtime friend of Eisner’s, and a founder of Creative Artists Agency
63. See, e.g., Matthew R. Berry, Comment, Does Delaware’s Section 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless
Directors from Personal Liability?  Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith, 79 WASH. L. REV.
1125, 1146 (2004).
64. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 753–54.
65. Id. at 699–745.
66. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 35 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
67. Id. at 36.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
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(CAA), a leading talent agency.72  Ovitz was considered one of the
most powerful people in Hollywood, and his role at CAA provided
him with an annual income of more than $20 million.73  Accordingly,
his recruitment required a substantial offer.  Ovitz insisted that he
would not give up his fifty-five percent interest in CAA unless he re-
ceived “downside protection.”74
The result was a draft Ovitz employment agreement (the OEA),
which provided for a five-year contract with two tranches of stock op-
tions.75  If Ovitz was terminated on any ground other than “gross neg-
ligence or malfeasance,” Disney would provide a nonfault termination
payment that included Ovitz’s remaining salary, unaccrued bonuses at
$7.5 million per year, the immediate vesting of one tranche of stock
options, and a $10 million payment for the other tranche.76
Irwin Russell, a Disney director, raised concerns about the size of
Ovitz’s compensation, but also noted that “Ovitz was an exceptional
corporate executive . . . who merited downside protection and upside
opportunity.”77  Russell asked Graef Crystal, an executive compensa-
tion expert, and Raymond Watson, a Disney compensation committee
member, to assess the OEA’s terms.78
Crystal and Watson prepared computations of the range of values
for Ovitz’s stock options, and then met with Russell on August 10,
1995.79  Crystal subsequently informed Russell that, under the terms
of the OEA, Ovitz would earn approximately $23.6 million per year
for the first five years of his employment or, if he chose to exercise a
two-year renewal option, $23.9 million per year over seven years.80
Crystal believed those amounts would approximate Ovitz’s compensa-
tion at CAA.81  After further discussions, Crystal revised the OEA’s
value to $24.1 million per year for seven years.82
Eisner and Ovitz signed a letter of agreement that contained the
central terms of Ovitz’s employment.83  During the hiring process, the
OEA was amended in several respects, including changes to the strike
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 37.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 36–37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 38.
79. Id. at 37–38.
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 39.  The terms of the employment agreement were subject to approval by
Disney’s compensation committee and board. Id.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR203.txt unknown Seq: 15 21-FEB-07 15:23
412 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:398
price for the options.84  Ultimately, a revised OEA was presented to
the compensation committee.85
The compensation committee considered the amended OEA
terms, as well as other items, in a one hour meeting.86  Crystal was
available by phone if questions arose, but he was not asked any ques-
tions.87  The compensation committee voted unanimously in favor of
the OEA, “subject to reasonable further negotiations within the frame-
work of the terms and conditions” of the OEA.88  Immediately thereaf-
ter, the Disney board unanimously elected Ovitz as president.89
As president, Ovitz did not fulfill Disney’s hopes.  It is unclear
precisely why Ovitz’s employment worked out so poorly.  The plain-
tiffs alleged that Ovitz ignored Eisner’s directives, and generally did
very little in his new role.90  Ovitz claimed that Eisner’s micromanag-
ing prevented him from making desirable changes at Disney, and that
“he was not given enough time for his efforts to bear fruit.”91  Disney’s
directors claimed Ovitz did not adapt well to his new position.92  Re-
gardless of the actual reason for Ovitz’s difficulties, Ovitz received a
not-for-cause termination, triggering the $130 million severance
payment.93
B. The Legal History of the Disney Case
Following Ovitz’s termination, shareholders filed a derivative law-
suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery.  This lawsuit continued for a
number of years, and several of the ensuing opinions in the Disney
litigation are significant to defining the fiduciary duty of good faith.
Accordingly, the history of the litigation is set forth below, with em-
phasis on the Delaware courts’ discussions of fiduciary duties.
In their initial complaint, the plaintiffs made claims that fell into
three categories.  They claimed that Disney’s board breached their fi-
duciary duties in approving an extravagant and wasteful employment
contract; the board approved an extravagant and wasteful termination
agreement; and the board’s directors were neither independent nor
84. Id. at 40.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 41.
90. Id. at 42.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 42.
93. Id. at 35.
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disinterested.94  In the first Disney opinion (Disney I), Chancellor
Chandler dismissed the plaintiffs’ allegations with prejudice.95
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed this dismissal
(Disney II).96  The Disney II court found that the complaint failed to
allege with particularity facts sufficient to claim a breach of the duty of
care, a breach of the duty of loyalty, or corporate waste.97
The Disney II court rejected plaintiffs’ duty of loyalty claim be-
cause the facts alleged were inadequate to support allegations of di-
rector conflicts of interest or lack of independence.98  Moreover, the
court refused to permit the plaintiffs to replead their loyalty claim.99
Accordingly, the Disney II court affirmed the chancery court’s dismis-
sal of the loyalty claim with prejudice.100
The Disney II court also rejected the plaintiffs’ claims of a breach
of “substantive” due care.101  A duty of care claim, according to the
court, could only be based on allegations of an inadequate decision-
making process.102  The court did, however, allow the plaintiffs to re-
plead their claims of a violation of procedural due care.103
In addition, the Disney II court made several references to good
faith.  For example, the court noted that the business judgment rule
includes statutory protections for a board’s good faith reliance on an
expert’s advice.104  This protection provided a potential defense for
Disney’s directors, since Crystal had advised the board in making its
compensation decision.105
The court’s analysis of due care also provided insight into the link
between the business judgment rule and the duty of good faith.  In
rejecting the plaintiffs’ allegations that directors breached a duty of
substantive due care, Chief Justice Veasey explained that
“[i]rrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment rule.  Irra-
94. Disney II, 746 A.2d 244, 248–49 (Del. 2000) (en banc).
95. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 731 A.2d 342, 380 (Del. Ch. 1998);
Disney II, 746 A.2d at 248 n.1.
96. Disney II, 746 A.2d at 248.  Though the Disney II court agreed with the chancery
court’s dismissal of all of the plaintiffs’ claims, the Disney II court reversed the chancery
court’s decision to dismiss all of the claims with prejudice, allowing certain claims to be
repleaded. Id. at 267.
97. See id. at 248–49, 267.
98. Id. at 256–58.
99. Id. at 258 n.42.
100. Id. at 258.
101. Id. at 264.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 262, 266–67.  The court also permitted the plaintiffs to replead their claims of
corporate waste. Id. at 267.
104. Id. at 251.
105. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 38 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
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tionality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may
tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a
key ingredient of the business judgment rule.”106  An irrational busi-
ness decision could thus be evidence of a lack of good faith.
On remand, the duty of good faith played a central role. Given
the case’s procedural posture, this made sense.  Under section
102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), corpo-
rations may place exculpatory provisions in their charters that protect
directors from monetary liability for breaching the duty of care.107
The Disney Corporation had such a provision.108  And, following the
decision in Disney II, the plaintiffs’ duty of loyalty claim had been dis-
missed with prejudice.109  Accordingly, neither a due care nor a loyalty
claim was a promising avenue for the plaintiffs.
A section 102(b)(7) charter provision, however, does not protect
directors where their actions are “not in good faith.”110  In 2003,
Chancellor Chandler issued an opinion in which he denied the de-
fendants’ motions to dismiss (Disney III), based on the plaintiffs’ alle-
gations that the board lacked good faith.111  This decision apparently
represents the first time that a Delaware court had allowed a case to
move forward on a theory of good faith, independent of due care and
loyalty theories.112
106. Disney II, 746 A.2d at 264.
107. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (repl. vol. 2001).  This section precludes excul-
patory provisions that would eliminate liability:
(i) [f]or any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to the corporation or its
stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which involve inten-
tional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this title; or
(iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal
benefit.
Id.
108. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney III), 825 A.2d 275, 286 (Del. Ch.
2003) (indicating that the Disney charter included an exculpatory provision pursuant to
section 102(b)(7)).
109. Disney II, 746 A.2d at 258.
110. § 102(b)(7)(ii).  There are several ways to interpret this language.  Elizabeth
Nowicki suggests that actions “not in good faith” should constitute a separate category
from actions in “bad faith.” See Nowicki, supra note 7, at 59 (“Bad faith acts are very differ- R
ent from acts undertaken in the absence of good faith and only the latter facts need to be
established for duty of care and 102(b)(7) purposes.”).
111. Disney III, 825 A.2d at 291.
112. See Griffith, supra note 7, at 19–20 (“Good faith had never before been given an R
independent doctrinal effect, but had typically been mentioned in the context of the other
two duties, most often as an aspect of the duty of loyalty.”).  In fact, it was not obvious from
the prior decisions in the Disney litigation that the case would focus on the duty of good
faith. Cf. Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 7, at 1441 (“On remand, the case, as re- R
pleaded, morphed into a good faith case.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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In their amended complaint, the plaintiffs had alleged that the
board effectively permitted Eisner to hire Ovitz, and to decide the
terms of his employment and termination, without real board supervi-
sion.113  According to Chancellor Chandler, the allegations indicated
that the directors had “consciously and intentionally disregarded their
responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude
concerning a material corporate decision.”114  Concluding that the re-
pleaded complaint alleged facts that provided a “reason to doubt
whether the board’s actions were taken honestly and in good faith,”
the court permitted the suit to proceed.115
At trial, matters did not go so well for the plaintiffs.  In a lengthy
post-trial opinion (Disney IV), the court exhaustively analyzed the testi-
mony and evidence,116 and indicated that the board did not meet the
“best practices of corporate governance.”117  Despite these board fail-
ings, the court concluded that the board was not liable for a lack of
due care or good faith.118
In deciding Disney IV, Chancellor Chandler made a concerted ef-
fort to work out what the fiduciary duty of good faith actually means.
When the opinion was written, the Delaware Supreme Court and
Court of Chancery had not clearly defined (or at least agreed upon)
the content of good faith, and they had not consistently determined
whether the duty of good faith is an independent fiduciary duty.119  As
a result, the Disney IV opinion devoted considerable analysis to good
faith as a concept, focusing on the meaning of “bad faith.”120
Several themes emerged.  For one, Chancellor Chandler’s reason-
ing suggested that there exists an overarching concept of good faith
fiduciary duty that animates the duties of care and loyalty.121  This
113. Disney III, 825 A.2d at 277–79.
114. Id. at 289 (emphasis omitted).
115. Id. at 286.
116. See Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 699–745 (Del. Ch. 2005).
117. See id. at 745 (noting that compliance with fiduciary obligations does not alone
establish use of best practices).  The court concluded that “[f]or the future, many lessons
of what not to do can be learned from defendants’ conduct here.” Id. at 760.
118. See id. at 779 (entering judgment in favor of defendants on all counts).
119. Id. at 753.
120. Id. at 753–56.
121. Chancellor Chandler explained:
Fundamentally, the duties traditionally analyzed as belonging to corporate fiduci-
aries, loyalty and care, are but constituent elements of the overarching concepts
of allegiance, devotion and faithfulness that must guide the conduct of every fidu-
ciary.  The good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes not simply the
duties of care and loyalty . . . but all actions required by a true faithfulness and
devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.
Id. at 755.
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view of good faith may be conceptually right, but it raises an interest-
ing problem for judicial purposes because courts must distinguish
breaches of due care from breaches of good faith when applying sec-
tion 102(b)(7).  While a director’s failure to exercise due care may be
exculpated, actions “not in good faith” cannot be exculpated.122
Another significant feature of the Disney IV opinion was the
court’s conclusion that a fiduciary’s motivation for acting in bad faith
could stem from a variety of sources.123  “[G]reed, hatred, lust, envy,
revenge, [ ] shame or pride” would all be plausible sources of bad
faith.124  This follows naturally from the idea that good faith conduct
is grounded in the fiduciary’s mandate to act with honesty of purpose,
in the best interests of the corporate beneficiary.  To the extent that a
director is not acting in the corporation’s best interests, it should be
irrelevant precisely why a director has chosen to act improperly.125  It
is enough that the director chose not to serve the corporation.
The key to the Disney IV opinion, however, was the determination
that bad faith involves intentional conduct.  Chancellor Chandler an-
nounced that “the concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a con-
scious disregard for one’s responsibilities, is an appropriate (although
not the only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries have acted
in good faith.”126  Although this holding leaves room for other stan-
dards to develop, it makes clear that intentional conduct is the under-
pinning of bad faith acts by a corporate fiduciary.127
Chancellor Chandler further noted three primary situations in
which good faith duties are implicated:
122. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (repl. vol. 2001) (permitting charter provi-
sions eliminating director liability for breach of fiduciary duty but stating that such provi-
sions may not excuse liability for “acts or omissions not in good faith”).  In addition, while
allegations of a material conflict of interest will shift the burden of proof to the defendant,
it is less apparent how allegations of improper motives fit into judicial review of board
judgments. See Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 754 (“It is unclear, based upon existing jurispru-
dence, whether motive is a necessary element for a successful claim that a director has
acted in bad faith, and, if so, whether that motive must be shown explicitly or whether it
can be inferred from the directors’ conduct.” (footnotes omitted)).  The distinctions be-
tween bad faith and conventional disloyalty claims are not fully developed.
123. See Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 754.
124. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  The court also noted that “[s]loth could
certainly be an appropriate addition to that incomplete list if it constitutes a systematic or
sustained shirking of duty.” Id.
125. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“The reason for the
disloyalty . . . is irrelevant, the underlying motive (be it venal, familial, collegial, or nihilis-
tic) for conscious action not in the corporation’s best interest does not make it faithful, as
opposed to faithless.”).
126. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755 (emphasis omitted).
127. See id. at 755 n.459 (“Indeed, § 102(b)(7) on its face seems to equate bad faith with
intentional misconduct.”).
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A failure to act in good faith may be shown, for instance,
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other
than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation,
where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable
positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in
the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for his duties.128
Applying this understanding of the duty of good faith, the court then
found for the defendants on all counts.129
C. The Disney V Opinion
On June 8, 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court issued an opinion
(Disney V) affirming the chancery court’s holding in Disney IV.130  In
Disney V, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed a variety of claims
against the Disney directors, including claims under the duties of care
and good faith.  The court first affirmed the rejection of the plaintiffs’
duty of care claims.131  As a further development in the treatment of
due care in Delaware, that section of the opinion is significant in its
own right.132  This Article will focus, however, on the court’s analysis
of good faith duties.
In support of their claim that the directors breached their duties
of good faith, the plaintiffs argued that the chancery court had im-
properly substituted a definition of bad faith conduct in its post-trial
opinion (Disney IV) that was different from the definition used in its
denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss (Disney III).133  The Disney IV
opinion allegedly emphasized subjective motivation or intent as an el-
ement of bad faith.134  But according to the plaintiffs, under the ear-
lier Disney III definition, “directors violate their duty of good faith if
they are making material decisions without adequate information and
without adequate deliberation.”135  The plaintiffs claimed that this
128. Id. at 755–56 (footnotes omitted).
129. Id. at 779.
130. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 28, 35–36 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
131. Id. at 51–62.
132. For example, commentators have noted that not one reference is made to the Van
Gorkom case throughout the Disney V court’s due care analysis, despite the apparent rele-
vance of that decision to the Disney fact pattern. See, e.g., Posting of Christine Hurt to
Conglomerate, http://www.theconglomerate.org/disney/index.html (June 9, 2006).
133. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 62.  The Disney III court indicated that directors breach their
duty of good faith where they “consciously and intentionally disregarded their responsibili-
ties, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude concerning a material corporate
decision.” Disney III, 825 A.2d 275, 289 (Del. Ch. 2003) (emphasis omitted).
134. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 62.
135. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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change was prejudicial because they had relied on the earlier formula-
tion in presenting evidence at trial.136
Thus, the plaintiffs in effect argued that a breach of the duty of
care is a breach of the duty of good faith, and that their claims suc-
ceeded under this standard.137  The Delaware Supreme Court dis-
agreed.  The Disney V court found that the chancery court’s word
choice in its post-trial opinion had changed from its earlier formula-
tion, but that the substantive standard for bad faith conduct had re-
mained the same.138  More importantly, the Disney V court found that
it made no difference whether the chancery court’s formulation of
the legal standard had changed because plaintiffs would lose in either
case.139
In the Delaware Supreme Court’s view, the plaintiffs “essentially
concede[d] that their proof of bad faith is insufficient to satisfy the
standard articulated by the Court of Chancery”—i.e., the plaintiffs
could not make a showing of an “intentional dereliction of duty, a
conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities.”140  The plaintiffs’ good
faith argument instead depended on a legal conclusion that a breach
of care amounts to a breach of good faith.141  As a result, the plain-
tiffs’ argument had to fail because the plaintiffs were unable to prove
that the Disney directors breached their duties of care.142  Even under
the plaintiffs’ preferred definition of good faith, their claim could not
survive the decision that there was no breach of due care.
Given this conclusion, nothing further needed to be said on the
duty of good faith.143  The Delaware Supreme Court nevertheless de-
cided it was appropriate to address the nature of the duty of good
faith, given the importance of the subject.144  In the court’s words,
“some conceptual guidance to the corporate community may be help-
ful.”145  The ensuing discussion of good faith was arguably dicta.146
136. Id.
137. Id. at 63 (describing plaintiffs’ theory as a “verbal effort to collapse the duty to act
in good faith into the duty to act with due care”).
138. See id. (“Both formulations express the same concept, although in slightly different
language.”).
139. Id.
140. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. See id. (“For that reason, our analysis of the appellants’ bad faith claim could end at
this point.”).
144. The court emphasized that the duty of good faith played a prominent role in the
Disney litigation, yet “the duty to act in good faith is, up to this point[,] relatively un-
charted.” Id. at 63–64.
145. Id. at 64.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR203.txt unknown Seq: 22 21-FEB-07 15:23
2007] DISNEY, GOOD FAITH, AND JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY 419
Even so, the Disney V opinion offers significant guidance on what good
faith means for a corporate director.
The meaning of good faith, as the Delaware Supreme Court
noted, is open to several interpretations.  In particular, the court rea-
soned that three categories of behavior were candidates for “bad
faith” conduct.147  The first and most obvious category was “subjective
bad faith.”148  This occurs where there is “fiduciary conduct motivated
by an actual intent to do harm.”149  There is little debate that this first
category qualifies as a breach of the good faith duty.
The court’s second category consisted of cases where a fiduciary
acts “solely by reason of gross negligence and without any malevolent
intent.”150  Here, the court delved into the blurred line between bad
faith conduct and other fiduciary breaches.  The court acknowledged
that, from a philosophical perspective, the duty of good faith is neces-
sarily intertwined with the duties of care and loyalty.151
Despite this overlap among fiduciary duties, the court concluded
that the exercise of due care and good faith should be sharply distin-
guished.152  Grossly negligent conduct, without more, the court con-
cluded, cannot constitute a breach of the duty of good faith.153  The
court’s reasoning was primarily based on statutory guidance.  In par-
ticular, the court emphasized sections 102(b)(7) and 145 of the
DGCL, both of which refer to “good faith.”154
146. A case could be made, however, that the good faith discussion was an alternate
ground for the court’s substantive holding.  Toward the end of the court’s analysis of good
faith, the court stated that “we uphold the Court of Chancery’s definition as a legally ap-
propriate, although not the exclusive, definition of fiduciary bad faith.” Id. at 67.  The
court further stated that it “sustained the Chancellor’s finding that the Disney directors
acted in good faith when approving the OEA and electing Ovitz as President.” Id. at 67–68.
This language is consistent with a holding that the plaintiffs lost because they did not meet
the Disney IV court’s definition of good faith.
147. Id. at 64.
148. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Id.
150. Id.  The court also described this category as a “lack of due care.” Id.
151. Id. at 65; see also Griffith, supra note 7, at 43 (“Whether the question is confronted R
from the perspective of the duty of care or of the duty of loyalty is just a difference in
approach.  To put it another way, the fundamental question underlying both duties really
is good faith.”).
152. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 65 (stating that “from a legal standpoint those duties are
and must remain quite distinct”).
153. Id. at 66.
154. Id. at 65–66.  The court noted that “[b]oth our legislative history and our common
law jurisprudence distinguish sharply between the duties to exercise due care and to act in
good faith.” Id. at 65.  The emphasis was on the legislative side.  Because the need for
separation between good faith and other duties is of recent origin, a lack of precedent
supporting such a sharp distinction is not surprising.  Although the court cited common
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Under section 102(b)(7),155 Delaware corporations may adopt a
charter provision to exculpate directors from monetary liability for a
breach of the duty of care.156  However, a statutory exception excludes
coverage of exculpatory provisions “for acts or omissions not in good
faith.”157  In the Delaware Supreme Court’s view, “[t]o adopt a defini-
tion of bad faith that would cause a violation of the duty of care auto-
matically to become an act or omission ‘not in good faith,’ would
eviscerate the protections accorded to directors by the General Assem-
bly’s adoption of Section 102(b)(7).”158  Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that section 102(b)(7) weighed against treating due care and
good faith violations as one and the same.
Section 145 provides for the indemnification of directors and of-
ficers for litigation expenses under specified circumstances.159  Yet
this statute specifically limits certain indemnification provisions to
persons who “acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasona-
bly believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the corpo-
ration.”160  Under this statute, the court explained, directors and
officers “can be indemnified for liability (and litigation expenses) in-
curred by reason of a violation of the duty of care, but not for a viola-
tion of the duty to act in good faith.”161  The court concluded that if a
violation of the duty of care were automatically a violation of the duty
of good faith, these legislative protections would be nullified.162
In light of the need to draw a line between breaches of care and
breaches of bad faith, the court found the second category—actions
caused solely by gross negligence—inadequate as a formulation of bad
faith.163  The court therefore turned to a third category of conduct
that falls between the first two.  This intermediate category, the court
determined, “is what the Chancellor’s definition of bad faith—inten-
tional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibili-
ties—is intended to capture.”164
The Disney V opinion endorsed the chancery court’s definition,
offering two justifications.  The Disney V court’s initial reason for
law cases involving good faith, it did not explain how those cases supported the proposed
distinction. Id. at 67 n.111.
155. DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (repl. vol. 2001).
156. See id.
157. Id. § 102(b)(7)(ii).
158. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 65.
159. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145.
160. Id. § 145(a)–(b).
161. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id.
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adopting this intent-based definition was that it covers improper con-
duct that is not addressed by duty of loyalty claims in their classic
form—i.e., this definition covers misconduct by directors even if they
do not have a material conflict of interest and are independent of
outside influences.165  At the same time, it also covers conduct which
is “more culpable than simple inattention or failure to be informed of
all facts material to the decision.”166  Intentional dereliction of duty is
a form of fiduciary misconduct, but it is separate from the traditional
scope of care and loyalty claims.
The court’s second reason for adopting this intermediate defini-
tion was that section 102(b)(7) contains several exceptions: it does
not permit exculpatory provisions for “intentional misconduct,”
“knowing violation of law,” or for conduct “not in good faith.”167  The
Disney V court found that the first two exceptions are examples of
“subjective bad faith,” and inferred that action “not in good faith” de-
scribes less severe conduct.168  The court thus read the DGCL to dis-
tinguish between acts which involve an intent to do harm or break the
law, and acts which are “not in good faith” because they involve a con-
scious disregard of the director’s responsibilities.  Viewing intentional
dereliction of duty as an intermediate category enabled the court to
give distinct meaning to the phrase “not in good faith” contained in
section 102(b)(7).
After defining the duty of good faith, the court upheld the chan-
cery court’s rejection of the plaintiffs’ claims under the fiduciary du-
ties of care and good faith.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF DISNEY V FOR THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
A. The Significance of Good Faith as a Standard of Conduct
Disney V announces a definition of bad faith conduct that requires
an intentional disregard of a director’s duties.  To understand the sig-
nificance of this formulation, it is helpful to compare the alternatives.
The outcome in this case was not a foregone conclusion, and the inde-
terminacy of earlier good faith precedents allowed for a variety of
formulations.169
165. See id. (“To protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders, fiduciary
conduct of this kind, which does not involve disloyalty (as traditionally defined) but is
qualitatively more culpable than gross negligence, should be proscribed.”).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 67 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (repl. vol. 2001)).
168. Id.
169. For a helpful discussion of the various ways that Delaware courts conceived of good
faith in recent years, see Bruner, supra note 7, at 23–46. R
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One plausible way to read the prior case law was to limit bad faith
claims to cases involving dishonesty or improper motivations.170  How-
ever, Disney V offers no indication that bad faith conduct needs to be
linked to a director’s possession of “furtive design or ill will.”171  The
Delaware Supreme Court rejected the idea that a director must intend
to do harm to the corporation,172 and it made clear that director self-
interest is not a prerequisite to a finding of bad faith.173  Instead, the
court found bad faith is present where there is an awareness that the
fiduciary is not acting in the corporation’s best interests.174  All that
this requires is that a fiduciary be conscious that her actions are incon-
sistent with her responsibilities.175
In other respects, Disney V restricted the potential scope of behav-
ior that qualifies as bad faith.  In theory, bad faith might cover con-
duct that is more egregious than gross negligence, but less severe than
conscious disregard of one’s duties.  Hillary Sale, for example, sug-
gests that egregious violations of the duty of care should qualify as bad
faith.176  In her formulation, “[a]lthough a breach of good faith need
170. See, e.g., Berry, supra note 63, at 1146 (“The Delaware State Supreme Court requires R
that defendants have a bad faith motive or illicit intent to breach the duty of good faith.”);
see also Zirn v. VLI Corp., 681 A.2d 1050, 1061–62 (Del. 1996) (concluding that board
members’ misstatements were made in good faith because plaintiffs failed to offer any
evidence that the directors spoke with an intent to deceive); Desert Equities, Inc. v. Mor-
gan Stanley Leveraged Equity Fund, II, L.P., 624 A.2d 1199, 1208 (Del. 1993) (“[A] claim
of bad faith hinges on a party’s tortious state of mind.”).
171. Cf. McGowan v. Ferro, 859 A.2d 1012, 1036 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Bad faith is not sim-
ply bad judgment or negligence, but rather implies the conscious doing of a wrong be-
cause of dishonest purpose or moral obliquity . . . it contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
172. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66 (recognizing that bad faith is not limited to “conduct
motivated by subjective bad intent”).
173. See id. (indicating that a director’s behavior may violate the duty of good faith re-
gardless of whether the director has a conflict of interest); see also Stone v. Ritter, No. 93,
2006 WL 3169168, at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006) (“[T]he fiduciary duty of loyalty is not limited
to cases involving a financial or other cognizable fiduciary conflict of interest.”).
174. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67.
175. See id. at 66 (noting that a director’s “conscious disregard” for his duties constitutes
a breach of the duty of good faith).
176. See Sale, supra note 7, at 488 (“Good faith based liability, then, moves the bar from R
negligent behavior to deliberately indifferent, egregious, subversive, or knowing behavior,
and thereby raises issues related to the motives of the actors.”).  Although this standard
may sound intent-based, it apparently has an objective element.  Sale compares good faith
cases to federal securities fraud cases, where “[f]or particularly egregious behavior, it is
presumed that knowledge of an omission or misstatement existed, or should have existed.”
Id. at 489–90 (emphasis added).  Sale further suggests that “as the Disney cases make clear,
allegations of unintentional but flagrantly reckless actions or inactions are also problematic
and, if proved, are breaches of good faith responsibilities.” Id. at 493–94. But see Veasey &
Di Guglielmo, supra note 7, at 1448 (“How does one define gross negligence and good R
faith, and how does one articulate where gross negligence ends and failure to act in good
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not be intentional or conscious, it does require some sort of obvious,
deliberate, or egregious failure.”177  Yet following Disney V, a breach of
good faith apparently does need to be an intentional or conscious
breach of duty.178
The Delaware Supreme Court’s reasoning makes clear that bad
faith involves the defendant’s actual state of mind.  Although a direc-
tor might violate the duty of care and the duty of good faith at the
same time, this would be a matter of the director’s psychological
state.179  In the court’s example, a director could have a subjective
hostility toward his corporation, and for that reason fail to sufficiently
inform himself while making decisions, thereby also displaying gross
negligence.180  Both the duty of care and the duty of good faith would
be implicated by these facts, but the two concepts remain distinct.181
Alternatively, the Disney V court could have interpreted good faith
to include both objective and subjective standards, even under the Dis-
ney IV definition.  For example, Melvin Eisenberg understood Chan-
cellor Chandler’s definition of bad faith—“intentional dereliction of
duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities”182—as incorpo-
rating an objective element.183  In his view:
The terms “intentional” and “conscious,” as used in that and
some other tests, need interpretation.  The formulations that
employ these terms would make little or no sense unless they
mean either that the manager was conscious that he was dis-
regarding his duties or that a reasonable person in the man-
ager’s position would have known that he was disregarding
his duties—not that the actual manager was subjectively con-
scious that he was disregarding his duties.184
faith begins? . . .  Is there such a concept as ‘severe recklessness’?”); see also Griffith, supra
note 7, at 32 (“Any attempt to distinguish the recklessness inquiry by limiting it to extreme R
deviations from the norm must encounter the objection that corporate law already has
doctrines, such as gross negligence and waste, for dealing with extremes.” (footnote
omitted)).
177. Sale, supra note 7, at 493. R
178. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66 (describing bad faith in terms of an “intentional derelic-
tion” and a “conscious disregard”).
179. See id. at 65 & n.104 (describing how a director might have two coexisting mental
states—“subjective bad intent and gross negligence”).
180. Id. at 65 n.104.
181. Id.
182. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005) (emphasis omitted).
183. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 72. R
184. Id.
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On its face, the Disney IV formulation—“intentional dereliction of
duty, a conscious disregard of one’s responsibilities”185—indicates a
subjective standard.  One does not do something intentionally without
being aware of it.  But, even if “conscious” and “intentional” should
mean what Eisenberg contends, the Disney V rationale closes off that
possibility.186  A manager who did not know he had disregarded his
duties, despite the fact that a reasonable person in his position would
have known, is hard to distinguish from a manager who acted with
gross negligence.187  Eisenberg’s example is precisely what the Dela-
ware Supreme Court sought to avoid in rejecting gross negligence as a
category of “bad faith” conduct.
Throughout its discussion of good faith duties, the Disney V opin-
ion referred to conduct that is intentional.188  In rejecting the second
“bad faith” category—which would have equated bad faith with gross
negligence—the court referred to the fundamental torts distinction
between “conduct that is negligent (or grossly negligent) and conduct
that is intentional.”189  The opinion also indicated that the duty of
good faith is a vehicle to address conduct that is “qualitatively more
culpable than gross negligence.”190  In short, bad faith seems to re-
quire a subjective state of mind.
The court’s formulation also appears to avoid an indeterminacy
that plagues intent-based standards.  Sean Griffith suggests that there
is an inherent difficulty in attempting to distinguish questions of neg-
ligence and intent for business judgment purposes.  Defining conduct
185. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 755 (emphasis omitted).
186. This conclusion is further supported by language in the recent Stone opinion. See
Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006) (explaining, in the
director oversight context, that “imposition of liability requires a showing that the directors
knew that they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations”).
187. In fact, this type of conduct may not even rise to the level of gross negligence.
Arguably, Eisenberg’s example describes ordinary negligence because conduct that a rea-
sonable director would avoid is likely to overlap closely with conduct that a reasonable
director would believe violates his fiduciary duties. See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 72 (argu- R
ing that the Disney IV formulation of the duty of good faith must include conduct that a
reasonable person would have known violated his fiduciary duties).
188. See Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 66 (Del. 2006) (en banc) (referring to “intentional dere-
liction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities”); id. at 67 (suggesting it is
bad faith when “the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing
the best interests of the corporation, where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate
applicable positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a
known duty to act”).
189. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66 n.109.
190. Id. at 66.
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as negligent or as intentional requires courts to consider how individ-
uals choose to “direct their attention.”191  As Griffith explains:
Whatever the board is deciding, its intent, consistent with fi-
duciary principles, is always the same—to maximize corpo-
rate welfare.  To frame the question of whether they are
doing it as they ought to as a matter of recklessness or inten-
tional disregard is merely to conduct the negligence inquiry
under another label.192
If Griffith is right, a judicial reference to “conscious disregard”
could mean little in practice because negligence can easily be re-
phrased in terms of conscious disregard.  A court might recast a busi-
ness judgment in terms of subjective intent by determining that a
director was inadequately informed, and then conclude that the
choice not to gather the necessary information was intentional.  Grif-
fith argues that “[n]egligence merely sets the standard of reasonable
attention in doing something, but the decision to direct one’s atten-
tion can still be understood as a question of intent—that is, the choice
to allocate attention to one place rather than another.”193
Yet the reasoning of the Disney V opinion provides a potential way
out of this predicament.  The court expressly approved the definition
given by the chancery court, which covers instances
where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other
than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation,
where the fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable
positive law, or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in
the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious
disregard for his duties.194
This definition of misconduct is less malleable because the intent
question relates to the defendant’s state of mind with respect to known
duties.  It is more difficult to simply recharacterize negligence as an
intentional abdication of duty when the meaning of good faith is
framed in this way.  Following Disney V, a defendant who is unaware
that his acts violated his responsibilities does not breach the duty of
good faith, even if he should have known better.
191. Griffith, supra note 7, at 31.  In Griffith’s view, a director’s decision as to where he R
focuses his attention “can be characterized equally as intentional or negligent.” Id.
192. Id. at 32.
193. Id. at 31–32 (footnote omitted).
194. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67 (quoting Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005)
(emphasis added)); see also Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6 (Del. Nov. 6,
2006) (explaining, in the director oversight context, that plaintiffs must show that direc-
tors knew they were not fulfilling their fiduciary duties for liability to be imposed).
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In light of the confusion that has surrounded the duty of good
faith,195 Disney V creates a degree of clarity.  The court’s test for bad
faith—“intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s
responsibilities”196—is a straightforward, subjective standard of con-
duct.  Although this standard will be case-specific and does not ex-
clude other formulations in the future, it provides a meaningful
baseline for director obligations.  Good faith is all about the director’s
state of mind, namely, her belief that her actions are in the corpora-
tion’s best interests.
B. The Significance of Good Faith for Standards of Review
Unfortunately, the recent judicial guidance on the duty of good
faith fails to discuss the appropriate standard of review.  Standards of
conduct determine how a director should perform his duties, while
standards of review determine how courts should review that perform-
ance when deciding whether to impose liability.197  Corporate law
often provides one standard for appropriate director behavior and an-
other standard for purposes of liability.198
This distinction is particularly clear in duty of care cases.  Direc-
tors are expected to avoid negligent conduct when performing their
duties, but for purposes of judicial review, a successful claim under
the duty of care must show gross negligence—a higher standard.199
The standard of review can thus be crucial when it comes to enforcing
fiduciary duties.
The opinion in Disney V expressly stated that it did not address
“the issue of whether the fiduciary duty to act in good faith is a duty
that, like the duties of care and loyalty, can serve as an independent
basis for imposing liability upon corporate officers and directors.”200
The Disney IV court had indicated that the business judgment rule
could be overcome if a plaintiff showed “an act of bad faith by a pre-
195. See supra note 7. R
196. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 66–67.
197. See Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 437 (“A standard of conduct states how an actor R
should conduct a given activity or play a given role.  A standard of review states the test a
court should apply when it reviews an actor’s conduct to determine whether to impose
liability or grant injunctive relief.”).  Standards of review are relevant to courts when ad-
dressing claims of bad faith. See Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 26 (“[W]hile the baseline con- R
ception of the duty of good faith is a standard of conduct, noncompliance with that
conception does not in and of itself give rise to liability.”).
198. Eisenberg, supra note 21, at 438. R
199. Allen et al., supra note 14, at 449. R
200. Disney V, 906 A.2d at 67 n.112.
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR203.txt unknown Seq: 30 21-FEB-07 15:23
2007] DISNEY, GOOD FAITH, AND JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY 427
ponderance of the evidence,”201 but the Disney V opinion never de-
tailed what a plaintiff must do to prevail.
Post-Disney V, the Delaware Supreme Court has indicated that
demonstrating a breach of the duty of good faith is not an indepen-
dent basis for imposing liability, but rather an indirect way of impos-
ing liability under the duty of loyalty.202  Because a loyalty claim that
sounds in bad faith need not be grounded in a fiduciary’s conflict of
interest, however, there is potential room for claims of bad faith that
are different in kind from traditional fiduciary duty claims.  Courts
will still have to determine what kinds of allegations suffice to plead
bad faith.
Given that the duty of good faith provides a different basis for
imposing liability under the duty of loyalty, what should this mean in
practice?  Courts might make good faith-based claims very difficult to
allege, in an effort to avoid enforcing the duty against directors who
lack the subjective awareness that their actions run contrary to their
obligations.  Or, courts might ease the plaintiff’s burden, in an effort
to redress improper board behavior.203
A likely judicial approach would consider board conduct as an
indicator of director motivations.  Direct evidence of improper moti-
vations or intent is rare.  What usually is visible is the board’s decision
and its decisionmaking process.  Consequently, Delaware precedents
recognize the use of objective standards of conduct as a means of in-
ferring subjective states of mind.
For example, some modern business judgment rule cases permit
limited consideration of whether a business judgment is irrational.204
201. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 755 (Del. Ch. 2005).  The Disney IV court did note that the
burden would be on the plaintiffs to rebut the business judgment rule. See id.  As Claire
Hill and Brett McDonnell note respecting the Disney decisions, “neither court provided
much guidance as to what plaintiffs could do to demonstrate that decisions have been
made in bad faith (or lack of good faith) so defined.”  Hill & McDonnell, supra note 7, at R
13.
202. Stone v. Ritter, No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6 (Del. Nov. 6, 2006).
203. Cf. Griffith, supra note 7, at 8, 16–28 (contending that good faith rhetoric serves to R
“loosen the doctrinal constraints on the Delaware judiciary and to enable its judges to shift
the authority/accountability balance in response to a change in the set of pressures and
constraints then operating upon them” and describing cases that accomplish this result).
204. See, e.g., Disney II, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (“Irrationality is the
outer limit of the business judgment rule.” (footnote omitted)).  Rationality is often de-
scribed as a precondition for the business judgment rule presumption. See Bainbridge,
supra note 14, at 99 (“[S]ome courts and commentators contend that the business judg- R
ment rule does not protect an irrational decision.”).  For a suggestion that the role for
courts in assessing rationality of board conduct should be curtailed, see Michael P. Dooley,
Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461 (1992).  Dooley argues against adop-
tion of the ALI Governance Project’s version of the business judgment rule, stating that
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Chancellor Allen, in an effort to explain why this type of review is
permitted, has explained that “such limited substantive review as the
rule contemplates (i.e., is the judgment under review ‘egregious’ or
‘irrational’ or ‘so beyond reason,’ etc.) really is a way of inferring bad
faith.”205  This same reasoning is evident in Disney II, where the court
suggested that “[i]rrationality . . . may tend to show that the decision
is not made in good faith.”206
In White v. Panic,207 decided in 2001, the Delaware Supreme
Court offered the following guidelines:
The standards for corporate waste and bad faith by the board
are similar.  To prevail on a waste claim or a bad faith claim,
the plaintiff must overcome the general presumption of
good faith by showing that the board’s decision was so egre-
gious or irrational that it could not have been based on a
valid assessment of the corporation’s best interests.208
Although the White court’s language refers to “egregious” as well as
“irrational” decisions, this standard of review is directed at conduct
that goes so far that it could not have been based on “a valid assess-
ment of the corporation’s best interests”—in other words, the White
court’s standard resembles a rational basis test.  The fact that the White
court drew a parallel to corporate waste, a claim that requires a show-
ing of irrational squandering of assets, provides added support for this
reading.209
“[a]nyone who believes that the plaintiffs’ bar will not try to expand the definition of be-
havior that is ‘not quite rational’ has not been paying attention.” Id. at 477–78, 481.
205. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A. No. 10389, 1989 WL 7036, at *13
n.13 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989); see Davis, supra note 21, at 576 (suggesting that the rational R
basis test “serves as an objective confirmation of the critical, but entirely subjective, require-
ment that the directors have a good faith belief that their decision is in the corporation’s
best interest”). But see In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del.
Ch. 1996) (“[W]hether a judge or jury . . . believes a decision substantively wrong, or
degrees of wrong extending through ‘stupid’ to ‘egregious’ or ‘irrational,’ provides no
ground for director liability, so long as the . . . process employed was either rational or
employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests.”).
206. Disney II, 746 A.2d at 264.
207. 783 A.2d 543 (Del. 2001) (en banc).
208. Id. at 554 n.36.
209. See Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (Del. 2006) (en banc) (“This onerous standard for
waste is a corollary of the proposition that where business judgment presumptions are
applicable, the board’s decision will be upheld unless it cannot be attributed to any ra-
tional business purpose.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  Furthermore, the White
court specifically referenced a case that announced that bad faith may be identified by
“assessing whether th[e] decision is so far beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment that
it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground other than bad faith.” White, 783 A.2d at
554 n.36 (citing In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780–81 (Del. Ch.
1988)).
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More recently, in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors of Inte-
grated Health Services, Inc. v. Elkins,210 Vice Chancellor Noble deter-
mined that the irrationality of a board’s conduct is an appropriate test
for analyzing whether a corporate board acted “with intentional and
conscious disregard of a board’s duties.”211  In such cases, he ex-
plained, the court “will generally be required to look to the Board’s
actions as circumstantial evidence of state of mind.”212
Furthermore, the Elkins court would apply this standard when as-
sessing claims of bad faith that otherwise implicate duty of care viola-
tions.  The court reasoned that “[i]n the case of an alleged breach of
fiduciary duty for intentionally and consciously disregarding one’s du-
ties of faithfulness and care, the Court will focus on whether the
Board’s process is irrational.”213  This application of an irrationality test
for process would be a counterpart to waste claims, where the court
evaluates the exchange itself for irrationality.214
As the Elkins case shows, the Disney V opinion can readily be inter-
preted to permit courts to consider director actions as evidence of bad
faith.  And based on its fit with prior decisions, the Elkins approach is a
promising candidate for the standard of review in future cases.  Dela-
ware already has an established line of precedent that limits claims
against unconflicted directors to allegations that the directors’ actions
are irrational, whether in terms of waste or an irrational process.
Adopting a rational basis test would largely reaffirm the pre-Disney
case law, and it would be consistent with conventional understandings
of the business judgment rule.215
Admittedly, a rational basis test could also create doctrinal ten-
sion.  Duty of care claims are reviewed under a gross negligence stan-
dard.216 Disney V implies that the standard of review for claims of bad
faith should be different from the standard used to evaluate claims
210. No. Civ. A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).
211. Id. at *17 n.92.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at *17.
215. This result would require that a rational basis test is paid more than lip service.
Actual practices may diverge from announced legal standards.  Sean Griffith suggests:
[W]hat courts have done in analyzing good faith is to raise issues under each of
the traditional fiduciary duties, mix them together, then conclude that the
board’s conduct has thrown good faith into doubt.  It is difficult to reduce this
pattern of analysis to scienter or perhaps to any substantive standard, and at-
tempts to do so are subject to the criticism that they credit what courts say without
paying adequate attention to what courts do.
Griffith, supra note 7, at 33. R
216. Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005).
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under the duty of care.217  The court was quite explicit that bad faith
conduct is something more than gross negligence, and it sought to
avoid nullifying the effect of section 102(b)(7).218  This poses a prob-
lem if the test for inferring bad faith is equivalent to the test for gross
negligence.
If Delaware courts permit claims of bad faith as evidenced by a
board’s actions, a stringent pleading requirement could require a
showing of irrationality—conduct so egregious that it is inexplicable
except as a result of bad faith motives.219  A less demanding standard
could easily be confused with gross negligence.  Assuming the bar is
set this high, however, the required showing for a duty of care claim
and for a bad faith claim may still be indistinguishable.
The difficulty is that gross negligence is a nebulous standard.220
Depending on what gross negligence means, evidence of gross negli-
gence need not imply subjective bad faith.221  But recent statements of
the legal test for “gross negligence” in Delaware have been quite strict.
Delaware courts indicate that a successful allegation under the duty of
care calls for “facts that suggest a wide disparity between the process
the directors used . . . and that which would have been rational.”222  It
is hard to see how this level of irrationality would differ from conduct
meeting the test for bad faith articulated in cases like Elkins.223
217. See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text. R
218. See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text. R
219. In theory, courts might limit bad faith claims to an even narrower sphere, requiring
irrationality plus something more, such as sustained conduct. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo,
supra note 7, at 1457 (“[T]he question remains whether the good faith standard of review R
should result in liability for a single transaction or only for a sustained and egregious fail-
ure to direct the management of the corporation in good faith.”).
220. See Bruner, supra note 7, at 8–9 (“Setting aside whether gross negligence ade- R
quately summarizes the range of formulations identified by the court, the range of conduct
intended to be captured by the gross negligence concept is, at the margin, notoriously
difficult to identify even in abstract terms.”); Gevurtz, supra note 21, at 299 (“[I]t is difficult R
to pin a precise meaning upon the term gross negligence.  This has led some to suggest
that the term has no significance or, put another way, gross negligence is the same thing as
negligence, ‘with the addition of a vituperative epithet.’” (quoting Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. &
W. 113, 115–16, 152 Eng. Rep. 737, 739 (Ex. 1843)) (footnotes omitted)).
221. A prominent torts treatise indicates that the prevalent definition of gross negli-
gence “differs from ordinary negligence only in degree, and not in kind.” W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984).  If this is so,
then evidence tending to show gross negligence would not thereby demonstrate a con-
scious disregard of a director’s duties.
222. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507 n.39 (Del. Ch. 2003); see also Allen et al.,
supra note 14, at 453 (“The selection of a gross negligence standard to govern due care R
cases may be viewed as synonymous with, and as a practical way to articulate a judicially
useful metric to apply, the rationality test embodied in the business judgment rule.”).
223. A similarity here is arguably appropriate.  As former Chancellor Allen and his co-
authors indicate, pre-1985 Delaware “decisions that addressed director liability for non-self-
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To avoid circumventing section 102(b)(7), the standard of review
for bad faith must presumably be distinguishable from the standard of
review for a violation of due care.  This may be possible if one views
section 102(b)(7) as addressing prior iterations of “gross negligence.”
The gross negligence standard has fluctuated over time.  Historically,
some Delaware precedents have found grossly negligent conduct
where a board’s actions were arguably just negligent,224 and it was
such a case, Smith v. Van Gorkom,225 that triggered the enactment of
section 102(b)(7).226  Applying a rational basis test as the standard of
review for bad faith would at least prevent Van Gorkom-style liability.227
Perhaps the best that can be done to reconcile the case law and
the statutory language is to recognize that gross negligence is a mov-
ing target.  If in recent years the standard for gross negligence more
clearly requires a showing of irrational conduct, then successful allega-
tions of gross negligence may now imply a conscious disregard of di-
rector responsibilities.  Barring a decision to effectively forego
enforcement of the duty of good faith, there may be little alternative
but to accept this overlap.228  At any rate, if gross negligence ever falls
back to mean a less egregious form of misconduct—not an unthink-
dealing transactions suggested that the imposition of liability would require a showing akin
to subjective bad faith.”  Allen et al., supra note 14, at 450. R
224. See William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in
Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 872–73 (2001) (suggesting that in two
important decisions, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (en banc), and Cede &
Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), the “Delaware supreme court, although
purporting to apply the gross negligence standard of review, in reality applied an ordinary
negligence standard”).
225. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (en banc).
226. Allen et al., supra note 224, at 873 n.49. R
227. In Van Gorkom, a board of directors was held liable for a business judgment in
connection with a merger.  488 A.2d at 864.  The court applied a test that assessed whether
the directors informed themselves of “all material information reasonably available to
them.” Id. at 872 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Based on the facts, the directors’
liability was widely felt to be inconsistent with business judgment rule protections. See, e.g.,
Allen et al., supra note 14, at 458 (arguing that the Van Gorkom court abandoned “the gross R
negligence review standard in deed albeit not in word”).
228. It is also hard to generate workable alternatives.  For example, if courts included a
requirement that plaintiffs must allege particularized facts supporting an improper motive,
this standard might overlap with the conventional duty of loyalty inquiry, which looks for
allegations of a material conflict of interest.  If improper motives could be shown in
broader circumstances than traditional loyalty cases, the duty of good faith could be in
substantial tension with the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence limiting what
qualifies as a conflict of interest. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) (en
banc) (noting, in the demand futility context, that “[a]llegations of mere personal friend-
ship or a mere outside business relationship, standing alone, are insufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt about a director’s independence”).  A requirement of irrational conduct
plus an improper motive, on the other hand, might limit enforcement of the duty of good
faith to the point of irrelevancy.
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able event—a rational basis test for alleged bad faith conduct would
give teeth to section 102(b)(7).
A less exacting hurdle for bad faith claims would produce an
even greater tension with section 102(b)(7).  However, there are indi-
cations that Delaware courts may ease the requirements for a success-
ful claim of bad faith.  In particular, courts may infer bad faith where
allegations raise concerns under both the duty of care and loyalty,
without quite meeting the standard of review for either duty.229
An irrational decision has been described as “one that is so bla-
tantly imprudent that it is inexplicable, in the sense that no well-moti-
vated and minimally informed person could have made it.”230  Should
the Delaware courts adopt this standard for claims under the duty of
good faith, it would be a reasonable method of inferring a subjective
state of mind when little direct evidence of intent is available.  Never-
theless, it is not the only path available.  Choosing among standards of
review therefore requires an analysis of the business judgment rule.
V. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND THE DUTY OF GOOD FAITH:
A COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
A. The Business Judgment Rule Defined
The business judgment rule is often described as “a presumption
that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted
on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.”231  Although
the precise contours of the business judgment rule are debated, in
practice, this doctrine prevents courts from reviewing a board’s sub-
229. As Griffith notes:
The duties of care and loyalty have traditionally been viewed as distinct, with sepa-
rate doctrinal requirements.  Now, however, the good faith thaumatrope suggests
that there are situations in which the categories may be blended, allowing claims
to survive when some but not all of the traditional doctrinal requirements have
been met.
Griffith, supra note 7, at 44.  Hill and McDonnell advocate a sliding scale which would draw R
from loyalty and care concepts.  They suggest consideration of two elements:
First, structural factors were present that would be likely to cause the directors
making the relevant decision to be biased against the interests of the corporation,
where the decision itself concerns a matter where a director, officer or control-
ling shareholder has an interest adverse to the corporation’s interests.  Second,
influenced by those structural factors, the directors were grossly negligent in mak-
ing the decision.
Hill & McDonnell, supra note 7, at 25 (emphasis and footnote omitted). R
230. Allen et al., supra note 14, at 452. R
231. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
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stantive business judgments.232  Traditionally, the way for plaintiffs to
get around this presumption was to allege fraud, illegality, or a con-
flict of interest.233  Otherwise, a plaintiff would have to demonstrate
that the board’s decisions did not have a rational basis—i.e., that
there is no possibility of a legitimate business purpose.234
More recently (and controversially), there have been indications
that a showing of gross negligence will suffice to rebut the business
judgment rule.235  Claims of gross negligence that survive the business
judgment rule are quite rare.236  In addition, as a result of section
102(b)(7), the significance of permitting gross negligence claims to
move forward under the business judgment rule is somewhat lim-
ited.237  Exculpatory provisions may preclude liability even if there is a
breach of the duty of care.
Because an exculpatory provision does not cover breaches of the
duty of good faith, the ability to describe a fiduciary breach in good
faith terms grows in importance to plaintiffs.  An allegation of bad
faith may be the sole route to director liability in many instances of
corporate litigation, assuming directors do not have a conflict of inter-
est.  This is where the business judgment rule becomes relevant to
good faith duties.
In Disney II, the Delaware Supreme Court offered the following
formulation of the business judgment rule:
232. E.g., Disney II, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (“As for the plaintiffs’ con-
tention that the directors failed to exercise ‘substantive due care,’ we should note that such
a concept is foreign to the business judgment rule.  Courts do not measure, weigh or quan-
tify directors’ judgments.”).
233. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 95–99 (describing cases that recognized this ver- R
sion of the business judgment rule); see also Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1968) (supporting this formulation of the business judgment rule).
234. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 100 (“Even the reference to a rational business R
purpose requires only the possibility that the decision was actuated by a legitimate business
reason, not that directors must prove the existence of such a reason.”).
235. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993) (holding that plain-
tiffs rebutted the business judgment rule’s presumption by demonstrating that the defen-
dant directors failed to fully inform themselves of all material information reasonably
available before approving a merger agreement).  For a spirited critique of this decision,
see Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 90–95, 100–02.  In Bainbridge’s view, the result under R
Technicolor is that “the business judgment rule is nothing more than a restatement of the
basic principle that the defendant is entitled to summary judgment whenever the plaintiff
fails to state a prima facie case.” Id. at 101.
236. There are, however, significant examples of such decisions. See, e.g., Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873–74 (Del. 1985) (en banc) (finding gross negligence when
board members failed to properly inform themselves when making a significant business
decision).
237. For a discussion of the practical effect of section 102(b)(7) on due care claims, see
Allen et al., supra note 14, at 462–64. R
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[D]irectors’ decisions will be respected by courts unless the
directors are interested or lack independence relative to the
decision, do not act in good faith, act in a manner that can-
not be attributed to a rational business purpose or reach
their decision by a grossly negligent process that includes the
failure to consider all material facts reasonably available.238
As this wording indicates, the duty of good faith remains an integral
part of the business judgment rule.  When the rule is applicable, good
faith is presumed.239
Once good faith is seen as a distinct aspect of the duty of loyalty,
courts are faced with the possibility that good faith provides a new, less
demanding way to rebut the business judgment rule presumption.240
This could result in a more stringent standard for reviewing board
conduct than the rationality review currently recognized under the
business judgment rule.  In turn, this potential for a revision to busi-
ness judgment rule protections raises a host of policy concerns, not to
mention fairness considerations.  A new method of rebutting the busi-
ness judgment rule under the rubric of good faith could produce sub-
stantial changes in corporate law.241
B. The Indeterminate Ends of Fiduciary Conduct
When testing for a conscious disregard of a director’s responsibil-
ities, courts must contend with an incredible degree of uncertainty.  If
this problem is viewed solely in terms of accuracy, it is clear that an
inquiry into a director’s intentions will usually require some degree of
guesswork.  Boards rarely declare that they seek anything other than
238. Disney II, 746 A.2d 244, 264 n.66 (Del. 2000) (en banc).
239. See Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 7, at 1442 (“To carry out this entrepreneurial R
theme that lies at the heart of Delaware jurisprudence, the concept of good faith is an
immutable ingredient of the business judgment rule.”); see also In re J.P. Stevens & Co.
S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) (“[O]rdinarily the policy of the [busi-
ness judgment] rule prevents substantive review of the merits of a business decision made
in good faith and with due care.”).
240. See Griffith, supra note 7, at 15 (suggesting that the good faith duty “may demand a R
new standard for rebutting the presumptions of the business judgment rule—a standard
different from a showing of either gross negligence or an uncorrected conflict of
interest”).
241. Liability risk under the good faith rubric could be different in kind from liability
risk under due care claims, even if business judgment rule protections are otherwise
viewed as indeterminate. Cf. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Compe-
tition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1084–85 (2000) (“Indeed, good faith is
typically the key to insuring [directors’] protection under statutory and charter limitations
on personal liability and corporate indemnification provisions.  As a result, decisionmakers
may not face a substantial risk of personal monetary liability under indeterminate legal
rules.” (footnotes omitted)).
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the best interests of the corporation, and figuring out what thoughts
lurked inside the head of each director will typically be a daunting
task.242  Inevitably, there is a risk of judicial error.
At a more fundamental level, the measurement of a director’s
subjective good faith may require courts to rethink the ends of corpo-
rate law and fiduciary duties.  Without a clear idea of what ends good
faith directors are supposed to seek, it is difficult to determine when
directors have failed to make a valid attempt to achieve those ends.  If
courts look for bad faith in terms of conscious disregard, courts (and
directors) must be able to determine what corporate goals are
acceptable.
The business judgment rule is an example of an “incompletely
theorized agreement.”243  That is, its presumption produces a doctri-
nal result on which courts and commentators can roughly agree, even
though the higher level theories that support this convergence are in
conflict.244  As Cass Sunstein observes, the law is replete with agree-
ments of this type, and they can serve useful purposes.245  But incom-
pletely theorized agreements can also mask a serious dispute over why
a legal outcome is justified, and this dispute may come to the surface
in later cases.  Because the target of good faith duties is so founda-
tional, disputes over the ends of corporate legal doctrine—largely ob-
scured by the business judgment rule—are now relevant.
242. See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 16415, 2004 WL
1305745, at *38–40 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (noting, in the context of the duties of loyalty
and good faith, that “divining the operations of a person’s mind is an inherently elusive
endeavor”); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 658 (Del. Ch. 1988) (sug-
gesting that a board’s “subjective good faith . . . will typically, if not always, be a contestable
or debatable judicial conclusion”); see also Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the
Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 778 (2005) (recognizing the problems associated with
inquiries into directors’ actual motives).
243. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733,
1735–36 (1995) (“Participants in legal controversies try to produce incompletely theorized
agreements on particular outcomes.  They agree on the result and on relatively narrow or
low-level explanations for it.  They need not agree on fundamental principle.” (emphasis
and footnote omitted)).
244. While courts and commentators agree that the business judgment rule stands for
the general proposition that courts should be wary of second-guessing director decisions,
this is not to say that the precise contours of the rule are agreed upon. See Gevurtz, supra
note 21, at 287–88 (“[A] problem occurs when courts and writers attempt to inject specific R
content into this general proposition—immediately, a lack of consensus emerges as to
what the rule really is.”).  Among other things, there is substantial disagreement as to
whether the business judgment rule should be seen as an abstention doctrine or a standard
of review. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 89–100 (illustrating competing conceptions of R
the business judgment rule embodied in case law).
245. See Sunstein, supra note 243, at 1735 (suggesting that time pressures and the need R
for mutual respect support a judicial willingness to adopt incompletely theorized
agreements).
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Commentators debate lower level justifications for the business
judgment rule, such as creating optimal incentives for director risk-
taking or encouraging able directors to serve.246  But assuming there
is broad judicial agreement that the business judgment rule is proper
under some combination of instrumental justifications,247 it will rarely
be necessary to decide which of these justifications animates the legal
doctrine.
The business judgment rule also represents a convergence of dis-
tinct higher level value commitments.  Proponents of very different
ideas of fiduciary conduct may agree on the need for courts to refrain
from second-guessing a board’s substantive decisions.
Several of these higher level commitments are now implicated.
As defined in Disney V, the duty of good faith applies in cases of inten-
tional dereliction of duty and conscious disregard of responsibilities.
Under Chancellor Chandler’s formulation, quoted approvingly by the
Delaware Supreme Court, the duty of good faith covers circumstances
“where the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that
of advancing the best interests of the corporation.”248  This emphasis
on a director’s intent to advance “the best interests of the corpora-
tion” brings a major conceptual dispute to the surface.
Thanks in large part to the business judgment rule, directors are
free to exercise broad discretion when they interpret what the “best
interests of the corporation” are.249  This is not just a matter of discre-
tion regarding the best means to reach corporate ends (although the
choice of means is protected by the business judgment rule).  Rather,
the ends themselves are open to different interpretations.  If the busi-
ness judgment rule is modified to permit a searching judicial inquiry
into director motivations, the proper ends of director conduct will
likely need to be filled in.
246. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 14, at 455 (“A standard of review that imposes R
liability on a board of directors for making an ‘unreasonable’ (as opposed to an ‘irra-
tional’) decision could result in discouraging riskier yet socially desirable economic deci-
sions, because an ordinary negligence standard of care will tend to make directors unduly
risk averse.”); Gevurtz, supra note 21, at 305–06 (concluding that “a negligence standard R
should neither deter the taking of desirable risks nor punish simply bad results”).
247. But see Gevurtz, supra note 21, at 289 (arguing that “the rule should be abolished R
and directors [should] be required to live with the same rules of negligence as everyone
else”).
248. See Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
249. Cf. Elhauge, supra note 242, at 769 (“[D]uty of care laws never define the ‘best R
interests of the corporation’ as meaning solely the interests of shareholders, nor do they
ever define the interests of the corporation or shareholders to mean solely their financial
interests.”).
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A brief review of proposed ends demonstrates the diversity of the-
oretical opinion.  Suppose, for example, that we view director deci-
sions from the perspective of shareholder wealth maximization and
think of directors as shareholders’ agents—a shareholder primacy
view.250  Benefiting shareholders is a commonly accepted end for di-
rector action, and it is supported under several conceptions of fiduci-
ary duty.251  Putting aside the practical question of how best to attain
shareholder wealth maximization, a theory of shareholder primacy
leaves substantial room for different understandings as to acceptable
ends.
The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that time horizons are
open to director judgment: “directors, generally, are obliged to chart
a course for a corporation which is in its best interests without regard
to a fixed investment horizon.”252  Directors effectively get to pick
which shareholder time horizons to favor in their corporate strategy.
In addition, the idea of shareholder primacy is subject to investor risk
preferences.  If directors are viewed as agents of shareholders, direc-
tors must decide which shareholders they are acting to benefit.
Should the board look out for the interests of diversified or non-
250. Shareholder wealth maximization, along with shareholder primacy, is a commonly
held norm of corporate law. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 248 (1999) (“Who owns a corporation?  Most
economists and legal scholars today seem inclined to answer: Its shareholders do.”).  How-
ever, these norms are not beyond question. See, e.g., id. at 249 (“[W]e take issue with both
the prevailing principal-agent model of the public corporation and the shareholder wealth
maximization goal that underlies it.”); D. Gordon Smith, The Shareholder Primacy Norm, 23 J.
CORP. L. 277, 279 (1998) (contending that “the shareholder primacy norm is nearly irrele-
vant to the ordinary business decisions of modern corporations”); Thomas A. Smith, The
Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 214, 220 (1999) (“It will, under standard and plausible assumptions of modern fi-
nance theory, never be efficient for firm managers to ‘maximize shareholder value,’ as long
as there are fixed claims such as bonds in the firm’s capital structure.”); Lynn A. Stout, Bad
and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190 (2002) (con-
cluding that some of the most frequently made arguments in favor of the shareholder
primacy norm are incorrect).
251. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. 1998) (en banc) (“The board of
directors has the legal responsibility to manage the business of a corporation for the bene-
fit of its shareholder owners.”).  For an economic argument, see FRANK H. EASTERBROOK &
DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 36 (1991) (“For most
firms the expectation is that the residual risk bearers have contracted for a promise to
maximize long-run profits of the firm, which in turn maximizes the value of their stock.”).
But see Stout, supra note 250, at 1192–95 (contending that several nonshareholder constitu- R
encies can be seen as residual risk bearers).
252. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989); see also
Henry T.C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38 UCLA L. REV.
277, 308–13 (1990) (discussing the Paramount decision in the context of judicial efforts to
provide directors with discretion to decide on appropriate time horizons).
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diversified shareholders, risk-averse shareholders or risk-neutral
shareholders?253
The shareholder primacy norm is not universally accepted.  It is
also possible to conclude that corporate fiduciaries owe their duties to
the corporation as such, and that shareholders do not actually own
the corporation.254  If directors are not really agents of shareholders,
but independent actors assigned to make assessments of the corpora-
tion’s best interests, this opens up a greater range for director choices.
Perhaps the board of directors is more like a “Platonic guardian,”
granted substantial discretion to decide what is in the corporation’s
interests.255
Under a director primacy conception, where directors are not
considered agents but independent actors, directors may still owe a
duty of shareholder wealth maximization.256  Yet some theories sug-
gest that a duty to the corporation should include consideration of
the various constituencies that comprise the corporate entity.257
Under a team-production theory of the corporation, for example, di-
rectors owe a duty to all members of the corporate “team.”258  Follow-
253. See Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor Diversi-
fication Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 BUS. LAW. 429, 442 (1998) (noting that directors would
reach different results depending on whether they seek to benefit diversified or nondiversi-
fied shareholder interests).
254. See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 250, at 253 (“[B]oards exist not to protect share- R
holders per se, but to protect the enterprise-specific investments of all the members of the
corporate ‘team,’ including shareholders, managers, rank and file employees, and possibly
other groups, such as creditors.”).
255. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Govern-
ance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550–51 (2003) (asserting that “the board of directors is not a
mere agent of the shareholders, but rather is a sui generis body—a sort of Platonic guard-
ian—serving as the nexus for the various contracts comprising the corporation” (footnote
omitted)). But see Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 663 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(“The theory of our corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the
shareholders; it does not create Platonic masters.”).
256. See Bainbridge, supra note 255, at 572 (“Director primacy does not deny that the R
proper ‘end’ of corporate governance is shareholder wealth maximization.  Director pri-
macy does deny the logic of shareholder primacy—that the powers of the board of direc-
tors are delegated to the board by shareholders.” (footnote omitted)).
257. A variety of scholars support some form of duty to nonshareholder constituencies.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 250, at 253 n.16 (listing scholarly articles so arguing).  It is also R
possible to view this doctrinal result in terms of shareholder wealth maximization, but with
respect to all shareholders, rather than to shareholders of a specific firm. See Stout, supra
note 250, at 1203 (noting “the possibility that allowing directors discretion to consider the R
interests of stakeholder groups can encourage firm-specific investment, and so be in the ex
ante interests of shareholders as a class, even if not always in the ex post interests of the
shareholders of a particular firm”).
258. Blair & Stout, supra note 250, at 253. R
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ing this model, it is acceptable for the board to take into account the
interests of corporate employees and other corporate stakeholders.259
The idea of a director duty to nonshareholder stakeholders is
supported by case law.  In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,260 the
Delaware Supreme Court determined that, when the board considers
a response to a perceived threat to corporate interests from a takeover
bid, it can take into account the interests of various constituencies,
and that the interests of shareholders need not be a controlling fac-
tor.261  Also, in cases where the corporation is on the brink of insol-
vency, directors are thought to owe duties to the corporate enterprise,
not just to the shareholders.262
As Stephen Bainbridge notes, the possibility of a duty toward dif-
ferent corporate constituencies raises a “two masters problem.”263
Boards face indeterminacy regarding their duties.  Perhaps more
troubling, a director who acted out of selfish motives could more eas-
ily mask his aim by couching his decision in terms of benefits to one of
many permissible constituencies.264  But these concerns aside, the
case law can be reasonably interpreted to support a team-production
understanding, where directors are permitted to look out for the vari-
ous members of the “team” that makes the corporation run.  The
board may simply owe duties to adverse parties, as shareholders, em-
ployees, and creditors will not always have the same interests.
At the margins, moreover, the range of acceptable ends may be
broader still.  Einer Elhauge has recently suggested that directors have
the discretion to act in the public interest, even in instances where it
appears that the board’s decision is not profit-maximizing.265  Once
again, Delaware precedents bolster this theory.  In Mills Acquisition Co.
259. Id.
260. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
261. Id. at 955–56.
262. See, e.g., Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., Civ. A.
No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *34 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (“At least where a corporation
is operating in the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent of the
residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enterprise.”).  For a helpful analysis
of this case, see Production Resources Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772,
787–89 (Del. Ch. 2004).
263. See Bainbridge, supra note 255, at 581 (“Because stakeholder decisionmaking mod- R
els necessarily create a two masters problem, such models inevitably lead to indeterminate
results. . . .  The alternative to following the shareholder wealth maximization norm
would . . . force directors to struggle with indeterminate balancing standards.” (footnote
omitted)); see also EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 251, at 38 (“[A] manager told to R
serve two masters . . . has been freed of both and is answerable to neither.”).
264. Bainbridge, supra note 255, at 581. R
265. Elhauge, supra note 242, at 743. R
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v. Macmillan, Inc.,266 for example, the Delaware Supreme Court indi-
cated that directors may reject a tender offer based upon a variety of
factors, including “any special factors bearing on stockholder and
public interests.”267  Although shareholder interests occupy a primary
role, the public interest is occasionally viewed as an acceptable
consideration.
Elhauge also suggests that profitability may be assessed ex ante
and ex post.268  A profit-sacrificing transaction could be the result of
an ex ante implicit understanding between a corporation and other
parties.  A city might provide regulatory benefits to a corporation, with
an implicit expectation that the corporation will act to benefit the lo-
cal community in future years.269  The city might show forbearance in
its zoning regulations in hopes of corporate conduct that will meet
moral and social norms.270  The corporation might respond to
favorable regulation by restraining its profit-maximizing behavior in
situations in which it would impinge on the city’s interests.271  This
trade-off might appear profitable when assessed ex ante, but the cor-
poration’s subsequent charitable acts could appear profit-sacrificing
when viewed in isolation after the fact.272
This Article will not take a position on the merits of these com-
peting theories.  Each conception of appropriate corporate ends has
some basis in case law, and Delaware courts have yet to clearly pin
down a theory of director duties to resolve this indeterminacy.273  As a
result of business judgment rule protections, a true resolution of fidu-
ciary ends is often unnecessary.  Yet in order to fairly assess whether a
266. 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989).
267. Id. at 1285 n.35 (citing Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954–56
(Del. 1985)).
268. Elhauge, supra note 242, at 779. R
269. Id. at 780.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Elhauge explains that
[a] regime that denied corporate managers the discretion to engage in ex post
profit-sacrifices would decrease shareholder profits in such cases, for it is the pros-
pect of such managerial behavior that encourages others to treat the corporation
in beneficial ways that increase profits before the profit-sacrificing decision has to
be made.
Id. at 780–81.
273. See William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the
Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (2002) (asserting that Delaware corporate
law is ambivalent on the issue of “whether corporation law exists solely in order to facilitate
shareholder economic welfare or whether the ‘republican’ form of corporate governance
represents a partial commitment by the law to values in addition to implementing share-
holder will”).
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director has consciously disregarded the best interests of the corpora-
tion, it may become necessary to figure out what or whose “best inter-
ests” are at issue.
Perhaps the question of corporate ends can be evaded in specific
cases, even with major inroads on the business judgment rule.  For
example, a transaction could be viewed as objectively “reckless” under
a shareholder wealth maximization theory and under a team-produc-
tion theory.  The creation of a standard of review that looks for evi-
dence of such “recklessness” could be plausible under several theories
of corporate “best interests.”  This possibility, however, seems overly
optimistic when generalized to all good faith litigation.
Under a rational basis test, differing high level views of corporate
ends are rarely implicated.  As an example, corporate waste or self-
dealing are both unacceptable under any of the views described
above.  If courts instead begin looking for objective recklessness,
“egregious” cases, or for conduct that implicates a mix of factors from
the duties of due care and loyalty, there will inevitably be instances
where a decision is more reasonable under one corporate governance
theory than another.  Assuming the duty of good faith results in a less
exacting business judgment rule, the current indeterminacy of ends
invites judicial error.
C. Risks of Error and the Indeterminacy of Acceptable Means
Whatever the appropriate ends, judicial review of director inten-
tions will also focus on the director’s chosen means.  If anything, this
focus on means raises an even greater judicial challenge.  For any par-
ticular corporate end, there are an indefinite number of reasonable
ways to achieve that end.274  Boundedly rational directors—directors
limited in their access to information and in their decisionmaking
abilities—must choose among those ends, with an omnipresent risk of
error.275  There is no standardized method to attain corporate ends.
To the extent customary corporate norms govern board behavior, the
274. As commentators have noted, business decisions generally do not involve one
“right” way to do things. Cf. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Care of Corporate Directors and
Officers, 51 U. PITT. L. REV. 945, 964 (1990) (“[B]ecause every business decision is unique,
directors and officers can seldom shield the quality of their decisions by pointing to proto-
cols or accepted practices, and factfinders will seldom have an objective benchmark to
guide them.”).
275. Even wise decisions will sometimes turn out to be serious mistakes in retrospect. See
Allen et al., supra note 14, at 454 (“[I]f the board chooses one alternative based on its R
assessment that a negative result is improbable, but the negative result nonetheless occurs,
the decision may (in hindsight) be ‘wrong’ but it is not ‘bad,’ because in any normal
probability distribution some outcomes will inevitably fall on the ‘unlucky’ side.”).
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Delaware courts have made clear that they are not legally
mandatory.276
Each case is also fact-intensive.  There will be some instances
where director conduct creates a very strong inference of improper
intent.  In contrast, a number of cases will offer plausible examples of
bad decisionmaking, yet good faith conduct.277  For example, assume
that a plaintiff contends a director acted to benefit a good friend, as in
the Disney litigation.  This same director might also think the chosen
transaction was highly desirable because it would benefit sharehold-
ers.  A director may have multiple motivations for reaching a particu-
lar decision.  These motivations, known only to the director, are hard
to disaggregate, let alone prove in a court of law as the basis of the
director’s business judgments.278
As Elhauge explains, the task of determining actual director moti-
vations is a very difficult one for courts to undertake:
[B]ecause subjective motives are unobservable, courts will—
absent the rare and unlikely-to-recur case of an explicit ad-
mission by management—have to ascertain motivation based
on which purposes seemed objectively probable given the ob-
servable circumstances.  Such an inquiry into objective mo-
tives will inevitably turn on the court’s business judgment
about which method of operation would actually maximize
276. See Disney II, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (“All good corporate govern-
ance practices include compliance with statutory law and case law establishing fiduciary
duties.  But the law of corporate fiduciary duties and remedies for violation of those duties
are distinct from the aspirational goals of ideal corporate governance practices.”).  These
pronouncements make it unlikely that standardized governance norms will permit courts
to readily assess the quality of most board decisions. But see Davis, supra note 21, at 584 R
(“Over time, a consensus might emerge as to how directors should act in a particular
situation.”).
277. Delaware courts have indicated that such good faith errors, no matter how severe,
do not violate fiduciary duties.  In Gagliardi v. Trifoods International, Inc., Chancellor Allen
explained:
To allege that a corporation has suffered a loss as a result of a lawful transaction,
within the corporation’s powers, authorized by a corporate fiduciary acting in a
good faith pursuit of corporate purposes, does not state a claim for relief against that
fiduciary no matter how foolish the investment may appear in retrospect.
683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614, 618 (S.D.N.Y.
1924) (“[Directors] are the general advisers of the business, and if they faithfully give such
ability as they have to their charge, it would not be lawful to hold them liable.”).
278. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 137–38 (1986) (suggesting that proving di-
rectors’ genuine motives is a difficult task, that such an endeavor may encourage directors
to perjure themselves, and that directors may try to defend against such an inquiry by
crafting documentation that justifies corporate decisions with vague rhetoric about long-
term strategy); see also Elhauge, supra note 242, at 778 (noting “the imponderable difficul- R
ties of sorting out mixed motives”).
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profits, which again gets us into the problem that courts are
worse at making such decisions than corporate managers.279
Hindsight bias is a significant concern when courts review these
judgments.280  Reasonable business risks will often appear foolish after
the fact, particularly when a transaction has failed spectacularly.281  To
the extent that courts are influenced by cognitive biases, an objective
recklessness standard may not be much different from an ordinary
negligence standard.282  Courts have the benefit of knowing the actual
outcome of a transaction and are aware of factors that were unknow-
able when the board’s decision was made.283  Courts are also
boundedly rational, and they may have less experience than the direc-
tors in the relevant area of expertise.284  These factors can readily bias
an ex post assessment of what is reasonable.
279. Elhauge, supra note 242, at 778. R
280. Hindsight bias is the tendency to exaggerate the predictability of past events.  Jef-
frey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.
571, 571 (1998).  For a thorough discussion of how this bias is relevant to legal decisions,
see Rachlinski, supra.  Rachlinski suggests that the business judgment rule arises from the
apprehension that hindsight bias can influence judicial decisionmaking. Id. at 621; see also
Allen et al., supra note 14, at 455 (indicating that hindsight bias “is one reason why the R
business judgment rule employs a standard of review that is more lenient than the standard
of conduct”); cf. Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial
Error, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 749, 758 (2000) (suggesting that the business judgment rule re-
flects skepticism about the quality of judicial decisionmaking).
281. See Allen et al., supra note 14, at 454–55 (describing the risk that courts will unfairly R
impose liability by erroneously “treat[ing] reasonable decisions that turned out badly as
bad decisions”).
282. Even a high standard of proof may not protect against hindsight bias if the bias is
particularly strong. See Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1097
(2000) (“If the hindsight bias is strong, raising the standard of proof might not eliminate
overdeterrence.  On the other hand, raising the standard of proof could swamp the bias,
leading to underdeterrence.”); see also Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 128 (“No matter how R
gingerly courts apply the standard of liability, trying to measure the ‘quantity’ of negli-
gence is a task best left untried. . . .  [C]ourts will be tempted constantly to apply the
standard in ways that sanction honest decisions that, with the benefit of hindsight, have
proved unfortunate or appear inept.” (footnote omitted)); cf. Dooley, supra note 204, at R
481 (suggesting that even a test for “rational” conduct may come to mean “reasonable”
conduct).
283. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 251, at 100 (“Judges also are accustomed to R
deciding cases on full records and may be too quick to blame managers who act—as often
they should—in haste or on incomplete information.”).
284. See id. (“Judges are neither chosen for business acumen nor fired or subject to
reductions in salary if they err in assessing business situations.”).  However, this argument
is debatable as applied to Delaware judges. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A
Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 589–90 (1990) (“[B]ecause corporate
lawyers are prominent in the Delaware bar, many judges come to the bench with corporate
law experience.”); see also Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 120–21 (“In contrast to judges in R
other states, however, Delaware chancellors frequently have considerable prior corporate
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Faced with a great risk of error in assessing a director’s subjective
intent, courts could plausibly choose to leave the business judgment
rule untouched.  If so, only cases of true extremes would expose un-
conflicted directors to liability.285  The test for a lack of good faith
based on objective standards of conduct would then be irrationality,
conduct which is considered so far beyond the pale that it is inexplica-
ble but for a director’s bad faith.286
D. Instrumental Justifications for the Business Judgment Rule
However, there is more at issue than the accuracy of judicial as-
sessments of directors’ intentions.  Courts often justify the business
judgment rule as an instrument to effect broader goals.  For example,
courts fear that a more stringent standard of review might discourage
directors from making risky but wealth-maximizing choices, thus indi-
rectly harming shareholders.287
Although these instrumental concerns buttress the traditional
business judgment rule, there are also countervailing arguments.  Pro-
ponents of enhanced judicial scrutiny in good faith cases point to the
incentive effects of a more stringent standard of review.288  Even if the
duty of good faith is difficult to enforce accurately, perhaps a more
plaintiff-friendly burden of proof would encourage improvements in
director behavior.289
experience as practitioners.  Once on the bench, there is a substantial pay-off for Delaware
chancellors who continue to master corporate law.” (footnote omitted)).
285. But cf. Griffith, supra note 7, at 32–33 (noting that “corporate law already has doc- R
trines, such as gross negligence and waste, for dealing with extremes” (footnote omitted)).
Technically, less extreme conduct might also trigger liability for bad faith, in the very rare
case of admitted bad faith motives that coincide with otherwise defensible transactions. Cf.
Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 749 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“The Delaware Supreme Court has implicitly
held that committing waste is an act of bad faith.  It is not necessarily true, however, that
every act of bad faith by a director constitutes waste.” (footnote omitted)).
286. See supra notes 205–206 and accompanying text. R
287. See Allen et al., supra note 14, at 449–50 (noting that the business judgment rule is R
“designed to encourage directors to act without undue inhibition”); id. at 450 (“By intrud-
ing on the protected space that the business judgment rule accords such decisions, courts
create disincentives for businesses to engage in the risk-taking that is fundamental to a
capitalist economy.”); cf. Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties: A Theory of
Good Faith for Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 123 (2006) (“Judicial error,
with the moral hazard that it encourages, has real costs when it comes to an optimal exer-
cise of business judgment.”).
288. See, e.g., Sale, supra note 7, at 494 (suggesting that the value of a separate duty of R
good faith “is not simply in the compensation it can provide to, for example, Disney share-
holders, but in the ex ante role it can play in changing the behavior and incentives of
corporate fiduciaries and, thereby changing corporate governance”).
289. See id. at 495 (“Strong enforcement of the duty of good faith creates an incentive to
prompt fiduciaries to better behavior, even if we cannot change their character.”).
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In the end, the fear of judicial error in specific cases is only one
of several reasons for having the business judgment rule.  As commen-
tators have noted, courts’ use of the business judgment rule is sup-
ported by a number of factors, including the fact that directors must
reach decisions with only limited information; the potential that com-
petent directors will choose not to serve if liability risk is too severe;
the potential that directors will choose less risky transactions, even if
they are also less profitable; the difficulties courts face in determining
ex post whether a board’s decision was reasonable at the time it was
made; and the ability of shareholders to remedy poor management by
electing new directors.290
Delaware courts have also justified the business judgment rule by
reference to the broad scope of directors’ statutory grant of author-
ity.291  Limiting the availability of derivative suits protects the board’s
ability to manage the corporation.  Recently, Stephen Bainbridge has
emphasized the potential negative effects of judicial review on intra-
corporate relations.292  Additional considerations include judicial
economy and the avoidance of exorbitant corporate litigation costs.293
If courts play a larger role, well-intentioned judges may push corpo-
rate policy away from the ideal, rather than toward it.
These factors supporting the business judgment rule may be deci-
sive in the aggregate, but if courts are to seriously consider a distinct
role for good faith duties in corporate litigation, they must weigh
these factors against the potential benefits of alternative legal doc-
trines.  A variety of commentators argue that the business judgment
rule is overly protective of directors.294  The policy basis for this claim
should not be dismissed out of hand.
290. See Allen et al., supra note 14, at 451–52 (discussing rationales for the business R
judgment rule); see also Davis, supra note 21, at 573 (identifying various rationales for the R
business judgment rule).
291. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) (en banc) (“Under
Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the fundamental principle . . .
that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by or under its board
of directors.”).
292. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 125–26 (“[J]udicial review could interfere with— R
or even destroy—the internal team governance structures that regulate board behavior.”).
293. See Douglas M. Branson, The Rule That Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment Rule, 36
VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 637–38 (2002) (“[A] policy behind the rule is conservation of the
judicial resource.  The business judgment rule is a filter that enables courts to easily screen
out non-meritorious challenges to the actions of directors and executives.”); Telman, supra
note 21, at 37 (proposing that the business judgment rule should be understood to act as R
“a prophylactic tool designed to protect corporations against exposure to litigation”).
294. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical Di-
mension of Global Corporate Governance, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1183 (1999) (suggesting
that a “lack of accountability exists because of the business judgment rule and the rhetori-
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It may be that a higher risk of liability under the duty of good
faith will cause directors to take their duties more seriously.  Corpo-
rate governance standards may develop that will be easier to enforce
in future cases.295  Chastened directors could develop an improved
corporate culture, or a market for professional directors could de-
velop.296  For that matter, experienced judges may be more accurate
in their assessments of good faith than people realize.297
These possibilities raise a series of questions.  How often do judi-
cial errors occur when courts review substantive board judgments?
How often do judicial errors occur when courts inquire into subjective
good faith?  Would it be worth over-enforcing the duty of good faith,
as defined in Disney V, if this would produce substantial improvements
in corporate governance?  Would it be worth under-enforcing the
duty of good faith to avoid deterrence of desirable risk-taking by the
board?  Is it even possible to determine how to weigh the costs and
benefits that could result from the available standards of review?
As the next Section will elaborate, these questions can only be
addressed under conditions of severe empirical uncertainty.  A neces-
sary part of the analysis requires a comparison of courts and boards as
decisionmaking authorities.  In order to take the various policy and
fairness concerns into account, and thereby determine the proper
scope of the business judgment rule, courts face a challenging institu-
tional choice.
cal nature of fiduciary duty law”); Gevurtz, supra note 21, at 336 (“[T]here is simply no call R
for treating business judgments by corporate directors any differently than any other judg-
ment.”); Telman, supra note 21, at 59–60  (suggesting that, outside of cases where the R
discovery process would harm the corporation, “the Rule impedes the adjudication of
shareholder rights and interests, prevents shareholder actions from constraining boards,
promotes board passivity and thus permits negligent boards to cause economic harm to
corporations and their shareholders”).
295. See Davis, supra note 21, at 584 (suggesting the possible emergence of a consensus R
among courts and experts as to proper director behavior). But see Disney II, 746 A.2d 244,
256 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (indicating that directors are not required to conform their
behavior to “aspirational ideals of good corporate governance” in order to avoid liability).
296. See Nowicki, supra note 7, at 67 (proposing that “a more exacting definition of R
‘good faith’ [will] either discourage potentially half-hearted directors from serving or will
give rise to a market in professional directors”); Sale, supra note 7, at 462 (suggesting that R
the duty of good faith “holds considerable promise for creating incentives to instill effec-
tive corporate governance”).
297. See supra note 284. R
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VI. THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND THE PROBLEM OF
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE: A DECISION THEORY RESPONSE
From an institutional choice perspective, decisionmaking author-
ity should be allocated to the institution that will best further the legal
goal at issue.298  Rather than focus on the strengths and weaknesses of
a single decisionmaking institution, the comparative merits of each
institution are assessed.  This approach has been urged as a guiding
principle for corporate law.299  Such institutional concerns are com-
monplace in Delaware precedent; case law indicates that the proper
division of authority among shareholders, directors, and courts ani-
mates many corporate law disputes.300
As will be developed below, setting the proper standard of review
for good faith calls for an institutional choice.301  Judicial oversight of
a corporate board effectively removes some of the board’s authority to
decide what is in the corporation’s best interest.  Courts, whether or
not they intend to do so, acquire decisionmaking authority when they
decide cases in a way that limits director choices.  Courts are deter-
mining how much authority the board possesses.
Assessing standards of review as an institutional choice, however,
raises a problem of intractable empirical uncertainty.  It is very diffi-
cult to test for the ideal balance of board accountability and board
authority.  The best that can be done to resolve this uncertainty is to
use principles adapted from decision theory—principles designed to
assist in choices that must be made under severe information con-
straints.  Following these principles suggests that courts should apply a
298. For a useful discussion of legal doctrine in terms of allocating institutional author-
ity over decisionmaking processes, see generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNA-
TIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) [hereinafter
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES]; NEIL K. KOMESAR, LAW’S LIMITS: THE RULE OF LAW AND
THE SUPPLY AND DEMAND OF RIGHTS (2001).
299. Wayne Hanewicz contends that “corporate law does and should allocate decision-
making authority to various institutions, such as the board, the shareholders, and the judi-
ciary, and . . . this decision-making authority ought to be allocated so as to most efficiently
advance the ultimate goal of corporate law.”  Hanewicz, supra note 23, at 511.  Hanewicz R
assumes that the ultimate goal of corporate law is shareholder wealth maximization.  Id. at
511–12.  This Article will leave that question open.
300. See id. at 529–31 (suggesting that the business judgment rule and the entire fairness
standard reflect institutional choice concerns); see also MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813
A.2d 1118, 1126 (Del. 2003) (“The most fundamental principles of corporate governance
are a function of the allocation of power within a corporation between its stockholders and
its board of directors.”).
301. See Griffith, supra note 7, at 15 (suggesting that the question of good faith is “the R
question of creating a new standard under the business judgment rule and thereby realign-
ing the balance between authority and accountability in corporate law jurisprudence”).
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rational basis test when confronting allegations of bad faith
conduct.302
A. The Role for an Institutional Choice Analysis
When a court reviews a board’s business judgments for breach of
good faith, its analysis will likely consider whether the board’s actions
or processes were designed to further the best interests of the corpora-
tion or its shareholders.303  At the least, the court would consider
whether a board’s decision could conceivably advance those interests.
Courts, however, may not be the best institution to determine a corpo-
ration’s true interests, and courts’ decisions may supplant the board’s
decisions.304
The analysis below will examine the business judgment rule with
an eye toward the ideal allocation of authority among courts, direc-
tors, and shareholders.305  From this perspective, the review of board
judgments for bad faith raises problems of severe empirical
uncertainty.
Business judgment rule protections can be assessed in terms of
which institution, or set of institutions, is best suited to making the
decisions at issue.306  In those cases where the business judgment rule
has teeth, it precludes judicial review of the board’s exercise of discre-
302. For these purposes, this Article will use “bad faith” conduct as a synonym for “ac-
tions not in good faith.”  The two concepts appear to be equivalent for purposes of the
Disney V opinion. But see Nowicki, supra note 7, at 59 & n.202 (suggesting that “[b]ad faith R
acts are very different from acts undertaken in the absence of good faith”).  In any event,
the policy considerations described in this Article would be the same for either concept.
303. This would be so even if the ultimate judicial inquiry is into the board’s subjective
good or bad faith.  A decision which is clearly not in the best interests of the corporation
would have bearing on the directors’ state of mind with respect to the decision under
review.  It is true, however, that some cases do not implicate an analysis of corporate inter-
ests.  For example, business judgments may also be reviewed for compliance with specific
statutory provisions.
304. The director primacy model of corporate authority reflects this concern. See Bain-
bridge, supra note 14, at 108 (“That we do not expose director decisions to judicial scrutiny R
absent self-dealing suggests that the law finds a value in the board’s authority that might be
lost if director decisions were routinely subject to review.”).
305. In addition, judicial review of business judgments is, de facto, an institutional
choice. See id. (describing the value of business judgment rule protections in terms of
“[the] observation that the power to hold to account is ultimately the power to decide”); cf.
VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 157 (“The idea that judges should take each case as it R
comes, interpreting sensibly in light of the materials at hand, itself constitutes an implicit
choice of interpretive method and an implicit allocation of interpretive authority.”).
306. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 255, at 602 (“[T]he [business judgment] rule ensures R
that the null hypothesis is deference to the board’s authority as the corporation’s central
and final decisionmaker.”); Hanewicz, supra note 23, at 529 (suggesting that the business R
judgment rule is connected to the question of “who decides?”).
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tion.307  Absent court intervention, business judgments are left to the
board,308 and potentially the corporation’s shareholders.309  Whether
such an outcome is desirable is a function of the costs and benefits of
selecting directors, courts, or shareholders as a decisionmaking
authority.310
This is not to say that all problems in corporate law should be
viewed through an institutional lens.311  Normative concerns, issues of
morality, and other considerations may supersede institutional consid-
erations.312  Statutory texts may mandate a particular doctrinal an-
swer, irrespective of whether this mandate produces an ideal
institutional outcome.313  For example, if the Delaware corporate
307. As described in Disney II, “[c]ourts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors’
judgments.  We do not even decide if they are reasonable in this context.”  746 A.2d 244,
264 (Del. 2000) (en banc).
308. Hanewicz, supra note 23, at 530 (“The business judgment rule results in the board R
being the decision-maker.”).
309. As Bainbridge suggests, however, in the public corporation context “the obvious
mechanical difficulties of achieving consensus amongst thousands of decision makers im-
pede shareholders from taking an active role.”  Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 106.  In addi- R
tion, there are also substantial information asymmetries. Id. But see Hanewicz, supra note
23, at 567 (arguing that shareholders may be better decisionmakers than directors in the R
context of a board conflict of interest).
310. See Hanewicz, supra note 23, at 569 (suggesting a multi-institutional approach R
“under which the shareholders would be treated as a separate decision-making institution
in whom authority might be vested simply because they are a better decision-maker under
the circumstances than alternate institutions.”).  In addition to shareholders, courts must
also be considered. See id. at 568.
311. For one thing, institutional analysis is arguably outside the scope of judicial inquiry.
Thomas Merrill notes that “[c]ourts, as they presently operate, are not in the business of
‘choosing institutions’; they decide cases.”  Thomas W. Merrill, Institutional Choice and Politi-
cal Faith, 22 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 959, 993 (1997).  To the extent that an institutional analy-
sis might be desirable, it may not be up to courts to make that decision.  In some cases, the
question of allocation of decisionmaking authority could be resolved by an authoritative
text. Id. at 991.  The arguments in this Article do not depend on the assumption that the
correct allocation of decisionmaking authority between courts and other actors will always
be a problem of institutional choice.
312. A commitment to faithfully following legislative commands, for example, could
also affect how a court decides on its institutional role. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills
Textualism, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2041, 2051 (2006) (book review) (“To reduce statutory inter-
pretation to an institutional cost-benefit analysis threatens . . . to anesthetize an arena of
public inquiry that is relentlessly moral, normative, and socially constitutive.  If constitu-
tional principle or meaning supports a certain methodology, that methodology ought to
be the presumptive baseline for federal judges.”).
313. It should be noted that, in the context of Delaware corporate law, such statutory
boundaries are somewhat permeable. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., If Corporate Action Is Lawful,
Presumably There Are Circumstances in Which It Is Equitable to Take That Action: The Implicit
Corollary to the Rule of Schnell v. Chris-Craft, 60 BUS. LAW. 877, 879–80 (2005) (noting Dela-
ware’s “use of a court of equity—the Delaware Court of Chancery—to ensure that corpo-
rate directors do not use the wide authority granted to them by statute for ends that are
inimical to the best interests of the corporations they serve”).  Even if boards could be
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code expressly required that courts review business judgments using a
negligence standard, there would be little room for an institutional
analysis to address optimal standards of review.
But the backdrop for the present analysis is a general grant of
board discretion, subject to a recently announced conception of the
duty of good faith.314  Delaware law is sufficiently indeterminate to
invite analysis of which entity should decide on the corporation’s (or
shareholder’s) best interests.315  In other words, this is not a context
where institutional considerations are superseded by textual or prece-
dential commitments.
Instead, the duty of good faith has provided an opportunity to
reconsider the scope of the business judgment rule.316  If there is a
new, distinct means to allege fiduciary breaches—by claiming bad
faith—the standard of review might provide an alternative to the ra-
tional basis test that usually covers the actions of unconflicted direc-
tors.  To determine what standard of review is appropriate for
allegations of bad faith, courts must think about what allocation of
decisionmaking authority is best suited to attaining desired outcomes.
Institutional choice analysis functions at an operational level as a
means of putting normative commitments into effect.  As Cass Sun-
stein and Adrian Vermeule observe:
In many domains, the question is posed whether one institu-
tion should review the acts of another, and if so, the intensity
with which that review should occur. . . .  In all of these areas,
it is important to pay close attention to institutional vari-
ables.  The costs of error and the costs of decision are cru-
cial.  It is necessary to examine dynamic effects.  There is no
sensible acontextual position on the question whether re-
viewed as the chosen institution to determine a corporation’s best interests through a strict
reading of the enabling legislation, the Delaware precedents have long made clear that
courts may limit that authority for reasons of equity.
314. The judicial role in enforcing equitable limitations on statutory grants of corporate
authority is long established. See id. at 881 (“Nearly thirty-five years ago, the Delaware Su-
preme Court emphatically rejected the proposition that compliance with the DGCL was all
that was required of directors to satisfy their obligations to the corporation and its
stockholders.”).
315. This is partly due to the longstanding indeterminacy of Delaware case law in gen-
eral.  However, it also stems from the novelty of treating good faith as an independent and
enforceable fiduciary duty in cases which do not properly raise due care and loyalty
breaches. See Griffith, supra note 7, at 19 (noting that, prior to Disney III, “[g]ood faith had
never before been given an independent doctrinal effect”).
316. See id. at 15 (suggesting that the question of good faith  “is the question of creating
a new standard under the business judgment rule and thereby realigning the balance be-
tween authority and accountability in corporate law jurisprudence”).
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view, of one institution or another, should be intense or def-
erential, or indeed available at all.317
Despite the need for a comparison of institutional strengths and
weaknesses, normative commitments may still be outcome determina-
tive.318  A court that seeks the best decisionmaking process for share-
holder wealth maximization could make an institutional choice
differently from one that seeks benefits for other constituencies.  If
judicial error is a consideration in assessing comparative institutional
merits (which it ought to be), it is necessary to define what qualifies as
an error.319  An observer with one value commitment might condemn
a court’s decision as badly mistaken, while another with a different set
of values might view the decision as enlightened jurisprudence.320
Debates over legal goals may be put to one side, however, if insti-
tutional considerations lead to the same results under disparate nor-
mative commitments.321  A devoted advocate of shareholder primacy
317. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 28, at 936; see also KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNA- R
TIVES, supra note 298, at 5 (“A link is missing . . . in analyses that suppose that a given law or R
public policy result follows from a given social goal. . . .  Embedded in [an] analysis that
ostensibly depends solely on goal choice is the judgment, often unarticulated, that the goal
in question is best carried out by a particular institution.”).
318. As Neil Komesar notes:
Goal choice and institutional choice are both essential for law and public policy.
They are inextricably related.  On the one hand, institutional performance and,
therefore, institutional choice can not be assessed except against the bench mark
of some social goal or set of goals.  On the other, . . . the decision as to who
decides determines how a goal shapes public policy.
KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 298, at 5; see also VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra R
note 28, at 80 (noting the importance of a value theory to institutional choice in the con- R
text of interpretive approaches).
319. Cf. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 80 (“Without such a [value] theory, we will R
be unable to know what counts as interpretive ‘error.’”).
320. For example, Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), and its expansion of
potential board liability for breaches of the duty of care, could be analyzed as a judicial
error.  A significant number of commentators see the case this way. See, e.g., Allen et al.,
supra note 21 at 458 (arguing that the Delaware Supreme Court incorrectly applied an R
ordinary negligence standard while purporting to apply the gross negligence standard of
review).  But the case also has its proponents. See, e.g., Eric A. Chiappinelli, Trans Union
Unreconsidered, 15 J. CORP. L. 27, 32 (1989) (indicating that the Van Gorkom case was consis-
tent with prior case law).  Absent an agreement on cases like this, it is hard to assess
whether courts are committing more, or worse, errors than boards.
321. Vermeule notes that “institutional considerations may themselves be sufficient to
select operating-level rules of interpretation in many domains, because different high-level
value theories converge upon similar operating-level prescriptions.” VERMEULE, JUDGING,
supra note 28, at 80.  Institutional choice might also permit courts to avoid deciding on a R
value theory.  Vermeule suggests that
value theories may be bracketed and thus ignored where incompletely theorized
agreements at the operational level are possible.  Institutional analysis might even
enable interpreters to choose particular doctrines before, or in place of, choosing
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may agree with an advocate of director primacy that a director who
engages in self-dealing should be required to prove the fairness of his
actions.322  Both advocates might also prefer a strong business judg-
ment rule, albeit for different reasons.  In cases of incompletely theo-
rized agreement, courts pursuing inconsistent theoretical ends could
still converge on a common result in specific cases.
This possibility—that different schools of thought might con-
verge on the same institutional approach—is in turn dependent on
empirical realities.323  If we take shareholder wealth maximization as a
goal, some allocations of decisionmaking authority depend on empiri-
cal considerations.324  For example, it is a factual question whether
shareholders or boards are better suited to making ordinary business
decisions, regardless of the goal against which these business decisions
are evaluated.325  It may or may not be more costly to a corporation to
have courts second-guess business decisions after the fact.326  Al-
though a multitude of factors would determine the answers to these
questions, each can, in theory, be resolved through empirical study.
B. Decision Theory and the Problem of Uncertainty
An important challenge then arises.  What if empirical analysis is
not an option?  In the social sciences, an empirical dispute can be
answered in the ensuing decades as more and more data is collected;
i.e., while scholars wait out the “stalemate of empirical intuitions.”327
a value theory that specifies what counts as a good or bad consequence of inter-
pretive practices.
Id. at 82–83. But see Eskridge, supra note 312, at 2054 (“How does one determine whether a R
decision is mistaken without the kind of ‘high level conceptual commitments’ that Profes-
sor Vermeule avoids?” (citation omitted)).
322. For example, Stephen Bainbridge supports a strong form of the business judgment
rule, but would make an exception in cases of self-dealing.  Bainbridge, supra note 14, at R
126–27.
323. See VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 83 (“The scope of convergence cannot be R
established in the abstract; it can only be established by inspection, through detailed con-
sideration of various interpretive areas and problems.”).
324. The choice of one’s goal has a potentially significant effect on what counts as a
judicial error, and may also affect how other costs and benefits are balanced.  Although
shareholder wealth maximization (and shareholder primacy) is embraced by many com-
mentators, the arguments set forth in this Article should apply to a variety of conceptual
frameworks, including the director primacy and team-production theories of corporate
law.
325. A strong case can be made that shareholders are inferior to boards for purposes of
making ordinary business decisions. See Bainbridge, supra note 255, at 557–58 (critiquing R
the idea that shareholders could efficiently govern by consensus).
326. For a helpful analysis of the potential costs arising from judicial review of board
judgments, see Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 109–27. R
327. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 153 (emphasis omitted). R
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Courts do not have that luxury.328  They must decide cases as they
arise, within a reasonable time frame.  They cannot wait twenty years.
Accordingly, when the relevant data is unavailable, courts must reach
interim decisions about how to interpret laws and about which institu-
tions should have decisionmaking authority in particular contexts.329
In a recent book, Adrian Vermeule grapples with severe empirical
uncertainty in the contexts of statutory interpretation and judicial re-
view.330  As he notes, some of the empirical questions that an institu-
tional analysis raises in this context are “trans-scientific”: there is no
cost-effective way to resolve them within a reasonable time frame.331
In some cases, experimentation is impossible to carry out in a reliable
manner.332  Comparative and historical empirical work is also doubt-
ful as a means to resolve this type of question, given the difficulty of
making comparisons when so many factors are involved.333
In addition, the judges who must make these determinations
have substantial information constraints and suffer from bounded ra-
tionality.334  As a result, for difficult institutional choices, “judges are
unable to put values to the variables that institutional analysis identi-
328. Id. at 154.
329. Id. at 149.  For example, Vermeule suggests an interim interpretive theory for “an
awkward transitional period in which academics and judges have begun to appreciate that
the dispositive questions about the interpretive system are empirical and institutional
rather than conceptual, but in which the relevant empirical information is largely absent.”
Id. at 289.
330. See generally VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28. R
331. Id. at 158.
332. Id. at 159.
333. Id.  This empirical problem readily extends to corporate law debates.  The difficulty
of comparing the corporate law doctrine of several jurisdictions to that of Delaware, given
Delaware’s unique status in corporate law, makes clear how hard it would be to conduct
experiments to test the effects of different methods for reviewing director good faith.  In
the case of good faith, the inquiry would be further hindered by the novelty of good faith
analysis and the uniqueness of each corporate concern. Cf. Griffith, supra note 7, at 8 n.16 R
(contending that the debate over the proper balance of board authority and accountability
“depends on empirical evidence that currently does not exist”); Stout, supra note 250, at R
1201 (“Whether the social losses from shareholder primacy outweigh the social losses from
allowing greater director discretion is an extraordinarily complex question.  Moreover, the
answer is likely to vary from firm to firm and from one historical period to another.”).  To
the extent that shareholder wealth maximization may not be the ultimate goal, the empiri-
cal question may be complicated further. See Jill E. Fisch, Measuring Efficiency in Corporate
Law: The Role of Shareholder Primacy, 31 J. CORP. L. 637, 638 (2006) (challenging the incor-
poration of the shareholder primacy norm into empirical analysis).
334. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 154–55.  For example, a judge will be largely R
reliant on the parties’ briefs as a source of information about the facts of the case, and will
not usually be aware of each development in the relevant social science literature.  Time
constraints and discovery rules preclude the exhaustive analysis that could contribute to,
for example, an economist’s study of the problems at issue.
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fies as relevant.”335  Cognitive biases contribute further inaccuracies to
the adjudicative process.  Accordingly, too much weight for some vari-
ables and not enough weight for others can lead to judicial error.336
And courts may be in a poor position to discover after the fact if they
erred in their institutional choices.337
Uncertainty and bounded rationality are thus fundamental chal-
lenges for courts assessing the allocation of authority between differ-
ent institutions.  The weighing of institutional capacities, decision
costs, error costs, and other systemic effects can be extraordinarily
complex.338  Where the probabilities of particular outcomes are
known, a rational decisionmaker can maximize expected utility by
comparing the outcomes in terms of their probabilities.339  Yet when
those probabilities are unknown, additional decisionmaking tech-
niques become important.
Vermeule’s response is to look to decision theory.  Decision the-
ory studies choices by rational actors subject to constraints.340  It ana-
lyzes how individuals may seek to maximize their expected utility
when they are lacking certain information.341
For purposes of this analysis, decisions may be made under condi-
tions of risk, uncertainty, or ignorance.342  In this context, decisions
under risk are made when the decisionmaker knows the payoffs associ-
ated with various choices as well as the probabilities associated with
those payoffs.343  Uncertainty arises where the decisionmaker knows
the potential payoffs of each choice but does not know the relevant
probabilities that the payoffs will occur.344  Ignorance exists when the
decisionmaker knows neither the payoffs nor their probabilities.345
335. Id. at 155.
336. See id. (noting that “salience causes decisionmakers to focus on vivid foreground
particulars, such as the hardships suffered by parties in particular cases, while ignoring
larger background abstractions, such as the systemic effects of interpretive rules”).  For an
analysis of the business judgment rule as a response to the problem of hindsight bias, see
Rachlinski, supra note 280, at 619–23. R
337. For this reason, a provisional institutional choice is problematic. VERMEULE, JUDG-
ING, supra note 28, at 164–65.  Courts may not readily assess alternative doctrines which R
they did not choose, and “[s]witching to the originally rejected doctrine in order to gener-
ate information about that alternative is possible, but highly destabilizing.” Id. at 164.
338. Id. at 154–55.
339. Id. at 171.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. Id.
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These concepts occupy a spectrum.  Where there is uncertainty, a
decisionmaker might have some knowledge about the probability of a
particular outcome.  For example, the decisionmaker might know that
the probability of a desired outcome exists within a band of likely per-
centages, perhaps 10% to 40%.346  In a more extreme case, even the
range of probabilities might be unknown.  Problems of institutional
choice tend toward the latter, more severe type of uncertainty.347
When courts review other decisionmaking institutions, multiple
variables are at issue, and they can be difficult to measure accurately.
Not only probabilities, but the values assigned to outcomes, may be
unavailable.  Furthermore, the relevant institutional actors are not
static—a change in one institution’s authority can readily alter the be-
havior of another institution.348  This is where decision theory can
help.
346. See Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 885 (2006)
(giving an example of such a case).
347. For example, Wayne Hanewicz suggests the following factors for consideration
when making an institutional choice in the corporate law context: “the risk preferences of
the different possible decision-makers, the possibility that a decision-maker may be be-
holden to a group with interests that are not aligned with shareholder wealth maximiza-
tion, and the transaction costs that each decision-maker faces in reaching a decision.”
Hanewicz, supra note 23, at 511–12.  Additional factors are relevant, including the poten- R
tial effects of legal change on each institution’s actions, and the potential for the chosen
institution to err in its judgments.  The possibility that values could be assigned to each
factor in the context of most business decisions, that probabilities could reliably be as-
signed for each factor, and that the conclusions would be anything other than contested is
remote. Cf. ELSTER, supra note 27, at 14 (“Uncertainty and strategic interaction, taken R
separately, create problems for rational belief formation.  When both are present, they
wreak havoc.”).
348. One answer that avoids the problem of uncertainty is to assign probabilities to the
relevant outcomes. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 171.  This may be done by as- R
signing probabilities based on frequencies from comparable situations in the past (fre-
quentism), or it may be accomplished by selecting subjective probabilities based on
“judgment and intuitive hunch” (Bayesian subjectivism). Id. at 171–72.  There is little basis
for assigning probabilities based on frequencies, given the case-specific nature of Delaware
law and the absence of decisions under an independent duty of good faith.  There is also
little reason to think that a court’s intuitive hunch would be a valuable method of assigning
probabilities in the present context. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 346, at 884–85 (“Even if sub- R
jective expected utilities can be assigned on the basis of behavior, regulators (like everyone
else) may well be operating in circumstances of genuine uncertainty.”); see also Vermeule,
Interpretive Choice, supra note 28, at 115 (“[D]ecisionmakers will sometimes simply lack the R
background information or sources of judgment necessary to form a probability estimate
that is more accurate than a random assignment.”).  As Jon Elster notes, a subjective
probability assignment may offer little reason to act on its basis. See Jon Elster, Risk, Uncer-
tainty and Nuclear Power, 18 SOC. SCI. INFO. 371 (1979), reprinted in JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING
TECHNICAL CHANGE 199 (1983) (“One could certainly elicit from a political scientist the
subjective probability that he attaches to the prediction that Norway in the year 3000 will
be a democracy rather than a dictatorship, but would anyone even contemplate acting on
the basis of this numerical magnitude?”).  As will be developed below, the analysis of this
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The Principle of Insufficient Reason.  Decision theory provides sev-
eral techniques to overcome uncertainty.  One means of addressing
uncertainty is through the principle of insufficient reason (also called
the principle of indifference).349  Under this principle, where the
probabilities of outcomes relating to two alternatives are speculative,
the unknown probabilities are assumed to be equal.350  An informal
version of this technique permits a decision to be made on the basis of
what is known, by assuming that unknown costs and unknown benefits
are equally likely, and therefore cancel each other out.351
Although it may be argued that costs and benefits rarely turn out
to be equal in reality, under conditions of severe uncertainty, the
probabilities and values of potential outcomes are unknown to the
decisionmaker.352  The allure of the principle of insufficient reason is
the idea that sometimes the best that one can do is to focus on what is
known.
This principle can greatly assist in resolving severe empirical un-
certainty.  As Jon Elster explains:
In many, indeed most, decision problems there are associ-
ated with each of the options a number of unknown and es-
sentially unknowable possibilities whose materialization
depends on the future development of the universe.  When
trying to make up one’s mind, one has to assume that those
and other unknowable factors on each side cancel out, so
that one can concentrate on the knowable ones.  Even
among the latter, one has to focus mainly on the known
ones, because of the direct costs and opportunity costs of col-
lecting and processing information.  The ensuing decision,
although not ideally rational from the point of view of an
Article is grounded on the premise that courts decide under genuine uncertainty, without
the ability to provide subjective probabilities in a useful manner. See infra Part VI.C.
349. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 173. R
350. DAVID M. KREPS, NOTES ON THE THEORY OF CHOICE 146 (1988) (describing the prin-
ciple of insufficient reason, “which says that if I have no reason to suspect that one out-
come is more likely than another, then by reasons of symmetry the outcomes are equally
likely, and equally likely probabilities may be ascribed to them”).
351. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 173. R
352. See id. at 174 (noting that the principle “might be akin to trying to pick the larger of
two numbers by choosing the one with the larger digit in the second decimal place, even if
one knows nothing about the digit in the first decimal place”)  However, there may be little
in the way of alternatives. See id.  (“If the decisionmaker knows that one component of cost
is higher in one regime than in the other, but has little other information, on what other
basis could the decision be made?”).
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omniscient observer, will at least be as rational as can be
expected.353
Other than random guessing, this may be all that one can do—when
probabilities and values are unobtainable, the principle of insufficient
reason provides a basis for making a reasonable choice.354
The Maximin Criterion.  In some cases of uncertainty, the principle
of insufficient reason will not suffice.  It may be that the known costs
and benefits produce a tie, giving an indeterminate result.  But there
are other strategies for deciding under uncertainty.  Another com-
mon technique is known as the “maximin criterion.”355  This is basi-
cally a strategy for limiting the downside risk of a decision.  Here, the
method is to choose the option “whose worst possible outcome is bet-
ter than the worst possible outcomes of the alternatives.”356
The maximin criterion assumes some degree of risk aversion.
But not every decisionmaker would avoid a downside risk if the poten-
tial upside of the choice is sufficiently worthwhile.  The case for using
the maximin criterion is therefore strengthened where the worst pos-
sible outcome under one option is significantly more undesirable
than the worst possible outcome under another option, and where, if
maximin were followed, any resulting losses in potential benefits
would be limited in scope.357
353. ELSTER, supra note 27, at 135.  Arguably, this type of thinking is necessary in order R
to engage in consequentialist reasoning, given that unforeseen events are always possible.
See generally Elinor Mason, Consequentialism and the Principle of Indifference, 16 UTILITAS 316
(2004).
354. It should be noted that technically, the principle of insufficient reason applies
under more ascertainable conditions than those implicated by institutional choice.  As
Vermeule recognizes, the principle of insufficient reason “assumes that the full range of
possible outcomes is known.” See Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, supra note 28, at 123 n.196. R
These conditions do not apply here.  Accordingly, the technique described in this Article is
really an informal analogue of the principle of insufficient reason, akin to the principle
described above by Jon Elster. ELSTER, supra note 27, at 135. R
355. R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 278 (1957).  Once again,
decisionmakers must use an informal analogue of the maximin criterion under conditions
of uncertainty.  As Vermeule explains:
Decision theory describes strategies or approaches that decisionmakers can draw
upon even if the formal conditions that describe those strategies are not satisfied,
for decision-theoretic criteria will often have informal, pragmatic analogues.  The
maximin strategy, for example, is well defined only if the payoffs of various out-
comes are specified.
VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 176; see also Sunstein, supra note 346, at 890 (sug- R
gesting that “a useful form of cost-benefit balancing is possible even without reliable infor-
mation about probability”).
356. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 176. R
357. Sunstein, supra note 346, at 892.  In cases where the worst-case scenario is just R
slightly worse under one choice than it is under alternatives, the criterion seems weak; and
in such cases, if the potential benefits lost by using maximin are substantial, it can seem
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The maximin criterion may be helpful in situations where the
principle of insufficient reason is inadequate to reach a decision.358
Additional options are also available.359  For example, “satisficing”—
searching until one finds an option that is “good enough”—is some-
times used in cases where the search for a correct answer could be
excessively costly.360  To the extent that courts are not in a position to
spend years searching for the correct institutional choice, satisficing
could assist in reaching an answer.  In extreme cases, a decisionmaker
irrational.  Although maximin appears to require infinite risk aversion in cases where
probabilities can be assigned, Sunstein suggests that it can make more sense in the context
of genuine uncertainty. See id. at 879–80, 882.
358. For example, the principle of insufficient reason would not be helpful if all of the
costs and benefits involved are speculative.  And, in some cases, the known costs may cut in
opposite directions. See Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, supra note 28, at 126 (“An interesting R
and troublesome feature of all-else-equal arguments is that they can appear on both sides
of a question of interpretive choice.”).  Along these lines, a change in statutory interpreta-
tion doctrine might lower decision costs, yet raise transition costs. See Eskridge, supra note
312, at 2054 (contending, in part on this basis, that Vermeule’s suggestions for statutory R
interpretation would produce “a tie” under the principle of insufficient reason). But see
VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 270 (suggesting the inapplicability of the transition R
cost argument in a case where transition costs would be small).
359. One option, generally not urged as a desirable method to resolve genuine uncer-
tainty, is “maximax”—choosing among alternatives based upon the best possible outcome
for each alternative. See VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 176 n.35 (discussing the R
possibility of applying maximax, while noting that it has “few supporters”); see also Evan
Tsen Lee, On the Received Wisdom in Federal Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1154 (1999)
(suggesting that “it is difficult to take the maximax rule seriously in any environment other
than a game environment”).  It is unclear whether the traditional business judgment rule
or another standard of review would produce the best possible outcome, nor whether the
best possible outcome would be significantly better for one option than another.
Another technique is known as the “minimax regret” criterion. LUCE & RAIFFA, supra
note 355, at 280–81.  This criterion compares the differences in payoffs between alternative R
choices.  Lee, supra, at 1150.  The difficulty with minimax regret as a technique for present
purposes is that potential payoffs have unknown values.
Yet another option is the “pessimism-optimism rule,” which compares average mini-
mum and maximum payoffs under each decision. See David H. Kaye, Playing Games with
Justice: Rawls and the Maximin Rule, 6 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 33, 35 (1980) (describing the
pessimism-optimism rule).  This rule leads to indeterminate results when assessing the bus-
iness judgment rule.  Although each of these decision rules has its strengths and weak-
nesses, some options are more helpful than others in the present context.
360. See David Schmidtz, Satisficing as a Humanly Rational Strategy, in SATISFICING AND
MAXIMIZING 30, 31, 33–40 (Michael Byron ed., 2004) (analyzing the merits of this tech-
nique).  Inasmuch as it is a matter of dispute whether the present case law is satisfactory, it
would not be helpful to assert that this method answers the uncertainty problem regarding
the business judgment rule.  Different standards of adequacy clearly matter here, and the
spate of articles debating the merits of Delaware law suggest the topic is one of controversy.
For an example of an article which concludes Delaware law is not close to good enough,
see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate Governance?,
48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1189 & n.2 (2003) (stating that the “laxity of Delaware law . . .  [w]ith
[its] shameful and disingenuous opinions . . . can no longer be in dispute”).
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might just “pick” among the alternatives,361 or use heuristics as a
means to reach a decision under time constraints.362
Several of these methods are useful when boundedly rational ac-
tors seek to resolve problems of uncertainty and institutional
choice.363  Depending upon the uncertainties involved, these tech-
niques also have their limitations, and there is debate as to whether
they are rational.364  In some cases, the methodology may be open to
manipulation.365  Nevertheless, it is hard to see an alternative to using
these methods, other than relying on raw intuition.  Regrettably, there
361. Given the probable negative reactions if courts announced they have just “picked”
an answer, this seems like a dubious methodology in the judicial context. See VERMEULE,
JUDGING, supra note 28, at 179 (“Overt picking is rare in law generally and in the formula- R
tion of interpretive doctrine in particular.”).
362. See, e.g., VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 180 (suggesting that a “take the best” R
rule, where decisionmakers employ “the single most valid cue or predictor,” may be useful
where “complex decision rules demand too much of decisionmakers whose ability to pro-
cess information is limited”).  This technique would seem to be indeterminate in the pre-
sent context, although it is arguable that a formalistic version of the business judgment
rule would be consistent with using this heuristic technique.
363. See id. at 168–69 (noting that the applicability of decision theory techniques is con-
text-dependent).
364. For example, the maximin criterion makes little sense when the worst case scenario
under consideration is extremely improbable and an alternative is “both much better and
much more likely.” See Sunstein, supra note 346, at 879.  It is also unclear what justifies the R
assumption under the principle of insufficient reason that unknown probabilities should
be deemed equal so that they cancel out. See Lawrence B. Solum, You Prove It! Why Should
I?, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 691, 697 (1994) (asking “[w]hy is it any more rational to
assume the states are equally probable than to make some other guess[?]”).  In addition,
different partitionings of potential outcomes may change the results under this method.
See ELSTER, supra note 27, at 43 (explaining that the principle of insufficient reason “rests R
on a naı¨ve assumption that the individuation of states is unproblematic”). But see
VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 173 (suggesting that “[s]ometimes outcomes do R
come prepartitioned by the nature of the problem or by established conventions”).  With
respect to analysis of the business judgment rule, the principle of insufficient reason tends
to partition into an analysis of two broad factors, the costs and benefits to the corporation
or to its shareholders. Cf. Mason, supra note 353, at 319 (contending that some version of R
the principle of insufficient reason is a necessary part of practical rationality).  It appears
that there are at least as many plausible costs as plausible benefits from creating new limits
on the business judgment rule.  Nevertheless, it should be noted that the manner in which
people decide under uncertainty may be a product of confusion. See Sunstein, supra note
346, at 889 (noting that individuals’ intuitions under circumstances of uncertainty may be R
the product of confusion).  The possibility that our intuitions are wrong does not, however,
offer a better technique.  This Article is premised on the idea that we lack a more reasona-
ble alternative to the decision theory approach described below.
365. See Eskridge, supra note 312, at 2056–57 (suggesting that a decision-theory ap- R
proach to statutory interpretation is subject to manipulation).  Eskridge’s argument ap-
pears much stronger in a context where decision theory is used to support a change from
the doctrinal status quo.  Eskridge is readily able to suggest different outcomes, and worst
case scenarios, based upon such factors as transition costs, which are inapplicable to the
present discussion.  Here, the doctrinal status quo already calls for a highly restricted judi-
cial role under the business judgment rule.
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is little reason to believe that personal intuitions are reliable when
assessing difficult institutional choices.366
Vermeule correctly notes that courts have few options where they
must make institutional comparisons under conditions of uncertainty:
“[T]he indeterminacy point is fatally noncomparative, because there
just is no other type or mode of reasoning on offer in such situations.
Concretely, the choices are that judges use some repertoire of weakly
reasonable techniques, on the one hand, or nothing at all, on the
other.”367  Given the import of making a correct institutional choice,
courts must assess the institutional alternatives in some fashion.
As the above examples suggest, there are a range of available ways
to decide under conditions of uncertainty, and their suitability can
depend on the decision’s context.  But, for purposes of addressing
problems like judicial review, some methods of resolving uncertainty
are more promising than others.368  This Article advocates use of the
principle of insufficient reason and the maximin criterion as reasona-
ble methods for assessing good faith and the business judgment rule.
C. Assessing Uncertainty in the Corporate Context
At the outset, one might ask whether Delaware courts face a prob-
lem of genuine uncertainty.  Decision theory has been suggested as a
method to address the uncertainty of institutional choices with respect
to judicial review of federal laws.369  It remains to be seen whether a
similar strategy fits the business judgment context.
At first glance, judicial review of a board’s business judgments
may not seem much like judicial review of federal statutes.  Boards are
not legislatures, and business judgments are not generally law-like.370
366. See supra notes 327–329 and accompanying text.  These intuitions might, however, R
be useful in assessing easier institutional questions. See infra note 416 and accompanying R
text.
367. See VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 182. R
368. For example, the use of frequentist or Bayesian methods of reducing uncertainty
are relatively unhelpful when courts are confronted with difficult matters of institutional
choice. See supra note 329.  As Vermeule notes, “the large-scale character of the institu- R
tional variables bars decisionmakers from proceeding on the sort of confident intuitive
hunches that often prove useful for quotidian decisions on a smaller scale.” VERMEULE,
JUDGING, supra note 28, at 163.  Burden-allocation techniques are also ill-suited to this type R
of context. See id. at 170–71 (indicating that the use of burden allocation in the interpre-
tive choice context “will often have the rhetorical function of saddling one view or another
with the weight of irresolvable uncertainty”).
369. See VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 230–88. R
370. Cf. Richard A. Booth, A Minimalist Approach to Corporation Law, 34 GA. L. REV. 431,
440 (2000) (“One might say that the business judgment rule is the corporate equivalent of
rational basis review in constitutional law, but it is not clear whether that helps explain
anything.”).  Interestingly, there are some historical links between corporate law and judi-
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Despite these differences, the parallel to judicial review of legislative
judgments is substantial.  In fact, the case for using decision theory to
resolve uncertainty in the corporate litigation context may be stronger
than it is in the constitutional law context.371
In both cases, the issue is how a court should review decisions
that have been allocated to a different institutional actor.  Courts must
decide who decides.  Section 141(a) of the DGCL gives boards the
discretion to manage the corporation,372 while Article I of the United
States Constitution gives legislatures discretion to enact legislation.373
In each case, the problem is how best to conduct judicial review of
discretionary conduct that has been delegated to another institution
when that other institution is permitted a very broad scope of accept-
able means and ends in exercising its discretion.
For example, in constitutional law, the Supreme Court has inter-
preted the scope of “general welfare” under the Spending Clause374
and the content of “public use” under the Takings Clause375 to allow
for a variety of public goals.376  This permissibility of different goals
implicates the standard of judicial review.  As Henry Monaghan has
explained:
[O]nce the Court has determined, as it now has, that Con-
gress can spend and take to achieve a virtually unlimited
range of goals, the constitutional standard recedes into a
deep background with the result that the political branches
are empowered to supply much of the operational content of
the constitutional clauses.  The Court, in short, simply deter-
mines whether Congress has exceeded the outer boundaries
of a very wide domain for choice. . . .  The standard is virtu-
cial review. See generally Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review, 106 YALE
L.J. 502 (2006).
371. In part, this is because there is less concern that an authoritative text precludes an
institutional analysis.  Another notable difference is that the prescriptions of the principle
of insufficient reason and maximin support the status quo in Delaware corporate law,
rather than calling for a significant change in legal doctrine. See infra Part VI.E.
372. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (repl. vol. 2001).
373. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
374. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
375. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
376. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that Congress could
properly use its power under the Spending Clause to encourage national uniformity in
legal drinking age); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that the
transfer of property from one private party to another in furtherance of a state’s economic
revitalization plan satisfied the “public use” requirement in the Takings Clause).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR203.txt unknown Seq: 65 21-FEB-07 15:23
462 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 66:398
ally empty because its premises postulate a virtually indefi-
nite number of permissible legislative goals.377
A similar range of permissible objectives affects the ability of courts to
police board conduct.
As described in Part V of this Article, boards may pursue a num-
ber of goals, each identified with the corporation’s interests, with
largely abstract constraints.378  And, boards may use a large and indefi-
nite number of means to pursue their chosen goals.379  The bounda-
ries of board discretion are vague, and to some degree the limits on a
director’s actions are aspirational.380  An abstract enabling act pro-
vides little guidance as to the limits of board authority, while judicial
precedent has largely left that authority untouched.
The breadth of board discretion in deciding what is in the best
interests of the corporation makes it difficult for courts to assess when
a particular board decision was the product of bad faith, even if bad
faith were defined to mean “severely reckless” or “egregious” con-
duct.381  Yet if we posit that a court can make these assessments in
377. Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
33–34 (1983) (footnote omitted); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitu-
tion, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1697–98 (1984) (“Modern rationality review is also character-
ized by extremely deferential means-ends scrutiny.  The Supreme Court demands only the
weakest link between a public value and the measure in question, and it is sometimes
willing to hypothesize legitimate ends not realistically attributable to the enacting legisla-
ture.”).  In addition, as with corporate boards, a judicial effort to determine subjective
legislative motivations is subject to serious difficulties. Cf. John F. Manning, Competing Pre-
sumptions About Statutory Coherence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2044 (2006) (suggesting, in
the context of rational basis review, that the Court’s “focus on outcome, rather than intent,
follows from the Court’s acceptance of the imperfections of the legislative process”).
378. See supra notes 232–251 and accompanying text.  This is so regardless of whether R
the court believes in shareholder primacy, director primacy, or some combination of share-
holder primacy with public interest concerns.  Under all of these models, corporate ends
are vague and permissive.
379. See supra notes 252–263 and accompanying text. R
380. See Disney II, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000) (en banc) (noting that “[a]spirational
ideals of good corporate governance” are not required by Delaware corporation law).
Many of the limits on board discretion may be seen as non-legally enforceable norms. See
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and the Self-
Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1685 (2001) (“[T]he duty of care is not a
negligence rule, but, rather, is intended to be ‘self-enforcing,’ with the self-enforcement
protected by the business judgment rule.”).
381. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 128 (“No matter how gingerly courts apply the R
standard of liability, trying to measure the ‘quantity’ of negligence is a task best left un-
tried.  As we have seen, courts will be tempted constantly to apply the standard in ways that
sanction honest decisions that, with the benefit of hindsight, have proved unfortunate or
appear inept.”).  Courts may also simply be incapable of subdividing modes of deference
beyond a certain point. See VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 220 (“Judges can operate R
in a mode of deference and in a mode of independent decisionmaking, but more refined,
intermediate modes are either psychologically unattainable or nonexistent.”).  The con-
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individual cases, that would not resolve the institutional choice
problem.382
The true question is whether, in light of numerous variables, it is
better to have the board alone or a combination of the board plus
other institutions (most notably the judiciary) decide the merits of
these business judgments.383  How do these options compare?
Historically, the substantive review of unconflicted board judg-
ments has not been a judicial task.384  As with many of the contexts
where courts review federal statutes, Delaware courts apply a rational
basis test to a wide range of business judgment cases.  A rational basis
test rarely challenges the decisions under review, effectively leaving
them to another institution.385  So long as a court can hypothesize a
cern with judicial accuracy in reviewing board judgments is also relevant in cases that impli-
cate an “abdication” of board duties. See Griffith, supra note 7, at 26 (questioning “whether R
the decision not to deliberate at all, like the decision to deliberate for ten minutes or
twenty, is not also a business decision, insulated from judicial second guessing by the busi-
ness judgment rule”).
382. Resolving institutional choice on this basis would be an example of a “single institu-
tional” analysis, that is, an analysis of one institution’s merits without the necessary compar-
ison to alternative institutions. See KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES, supra note 298, at 11 R
(suggesting failures of institutional analysis under a “single institutional” approach).
383. To some degree, cumulative review is inevitable in this context—the real issue is
the scope of that review. Cf. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 276 (“The costly layering R
of cumulative review is not peculiar to any particular regime of judicial review.  It is inevita-
ble, no matter how restricted the domain of judicial review and no matter how exclusive
the judges’ authority within that domain.”).  The option of judicial review to the exclusion
of board review is extremely unlikely. See Elhauge, supra note 242, at 777–78 (“Presumably R
shareholders . . . delegate managerial authority to professional managers because they are
better at managing businesses than judges are.”).  For that matter, boards still formally
retain their authority under a regime where courts review substantive business judgments.
The institutional question involves the effects of an increased allocation of judicial author-
ity to review board decisions.  A more frequent judicial review of business judgments could
prove too costly in practice.
384. As former Chancellor Allen and his co-authors note:
The pre-1985 Delaware (and the American and English) tradition was highly def-
erential to decisions made by well-motivated corporate directors who acted with-
out any conflicting self-interest.  Judicial decisions that addressed director liability
for non-self-dealing transactions suggested that the imposition of liability would
require a showing akin to subjective bad faith.
Allen et al., supra note 14, at 450 (footnote omitted).  And, as they suggest, the Disney II R
decision appeared to reaffirm this perspective on the business judgment rule. See id. at
465.
385. See id. at 452 n.12 (“Once invoked, the business judgment rule standard almost
always results in nonliability.”); see also Dooley, supra note 204, at 479 (“By definition, aber- R
rant behavior occurs so infrequently as to qualify as a ‘sport.’”); id. at 478–79 n.58 (sug-
gesting that the rationality test in Delaware “clearly does not mean, and cannot legitimately
be cited for the proposition, that individual directors must have, and be prepared to put
forth, proof of rational reasons for their decisions”); cf. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, R
at 268 (describing the rational basis test in constitutional law as a “de facto” retreat from
judicial review).
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rational basis for the action being reviewed, the court will leave the
decision undisturbed.386
Yet the weight of precedent does not decide this issue.  The re-
cent emergence of the duty of good faith does not require changes to
the business judgment rule, but it opens up that possibility.  Courts
may follow the implicit suggestion of Disney II, reviewing substantive
board judgments only when they are so irrational that bad faith is con-
sidered the only plausible explanation.387  On the other hand, Dela-
ware courts might use the duty of good faith as a tool to increase
scrutiny of board conduct.  Given the recent arrival of good faith lia-
bility as a distinct claim, courts must now decide if corporate law
would be better served by adding another layer of review to the
board’s decisionmaking process.
In inquiring into good faith business judgments, there are a mul-
titude of factors relevant to a comparative institutional analysis.388  A
more aggressive judicial review in good faith cases could have a variety
of benefits, including encouragement of responsible business deci-
sions, development of desirable corporate governance norms, ac-
countability for director misconduct, and mitigation of director
errors.389  Such expanded review could also include various costs:
harms arising from judicial errors, deterrence of desirable risk-taking
by nervous directors, an increased risk of frivolous lawsuits, added un-
386. See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 100 (“Even the reference to a rational business R
purpose requires only the possibility that the decision was actuated by a legitimate business
reason, not that directors must prove the existence of such a reason.”).
387. If the Delaware courts chose this option, the standard of review for good faith
claims could effectively be subsumed by preexisting doctrines. See Griffith, supra note 7, at R
32 (“Any attempt to distinguish the recklessness inquiry by limiting it to extreme deviations
from the norm must encounter the objection that corporate law already has doctrines,
such as gross negligence and waste, for dealing with extremes.” (footnote omitted)).
388. See Hanewicz, supra note 23, at 512 (suggesting that selection of a decisionmaking R
institution should involve evaluation of “the risk preferences of the different possible deci-
sion-makers, the possibility that a decision-maker may be beholden to a group with inter-
ests that are not aligned with shareholder wealth maximization, and the transaction costs
that each decision-maker faces in reaching a decision”).
389. See Sale, supra note 7, at 462 (suggesting that the duty of good faith “holds consider- R
able promise for creating incentives to instill effective corporate governance and prevent-
ing the kind of fiduciary abdication that has occurred”).  Melvin Eisenberg also suggests
that the duty of good faith may play a positive role where legal change is desired.  Eisen-
berg, supra note 7, at 75 (“Looking forward, the general duty of good faith may give rise to R
the articulation of new specific fiduciary obligations that come to be seen as appropriate in
response to social changes, but cannot be accommodated within the duties of care or loy-
alty.”). But see Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“Times may change, but fiduci-
ary duties do not. . . .  [T]he development of aspirational ideals, however worthy as goals
for human behavior, should not work to distort the legal requirements by which human
behavior is actually measured.”).
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certainty for various parties, transition costs as the new legal regime is
implemented, and decision costs from the litigation process.390
Most of the effects described above, such as potential deterrence
of director risk-taking, are matters of empirical conjecture.391  The
probabilities and extent of the costs associated with these factors are
unknown.  Reasonable arguments can be made that desirable risk-tak-
ing will substantially decrease if courts take a more active role, but
such arguments might be countered by noting the expertise of Dela-
ware courts in business matters and the potential for developing stan-
dardized norms of corporate conduct.392  Since each corporation is
unique, and each jurisdiction distinct, it is quite hard to assess how
much desirable risk-taking would be deterred by a particular legal
doctrine.
In this context, it is not just one factor, but several uncertain fac-
tors that must be weighed against each other.  It is impossible to esti-
mate how long it would take to obtain adequate empirical data on all
of these factors combined.393  An institutional choice, moreover, may
alter how the relevant institutions behave—for example, boards might
act to hide improper conduct if courts allowed more litigation to pro-
ceed—without substantially improving their behavior.394  Even if
there were reliable empirical results on some of these factors under
390. For a discussion of the effects of judicial review on director risk-taking, see Allen et
al., supra note 14, at 455. See also Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 110–17. R
391. See Telman, supra note 21, at 16–18 (indicating that there is a lack of empirical R
support for the conclusion that greater judicial scrutiny would result in undesirable avoid-
ance of risk-taking).
392. Cf. Gevurtz, supra note 21, at 307 (suggesting that an alleged lack of judicial exper- R
tise does not distinguish business judgment cases from other contexts, such as medical
practice claims, which apply negligence standards); see also Bainbridge, supra note 14, at R
120–21 (noting that Delaware judges have expertise in corporate law); Davis, supra note 21, R
at 586 (“[U]ntil some alternative institutional arrangements emerge to assume responsibil-
ity for developing standards for directors, we must look to the present system of a legally
enforceable, liability-based duty of care to play that role.”).  Some might argue that direc-
tors would be undeterred from desirable risk-taking as a result of section 102(b)(7) and
statutory indemnification provisions.  Because the context under discussion is a claim of
bad faith, however, those provisions would be of little use to a director defendant. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (repl. vol. 2001) (exempting good faith violations from
protection of exculpatory charter provisions). But cf. Telman, supra note 21, at 19–22 (not- R
ing the significance of these statutory protections in the business judgment rule context).
393. It may not even be true that some data is better than no data in this context. See
VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 162 (suggesting that the gains from acquiring data R
may not be continuous, such that the data obtained may be as helpful as “knowing only the
first digit of a phone number”).
394. For example, a director might reach a bad faith decision under a more expansive
regime of judicial review, but spend more time and effort hiding the true motivations for
his decision.  If so, an enhanced review could add costs without producing any benefit for
shareholders.
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the current legal doctrine, this data would not reveal much about
board behavior under an alternative set of doctrines.
Here, the indeterminacy of good faith is particularly troubling.395
Because of the uncertain content of “good faith” and its context-de-
pendent nature, it is not only difficult to assess when boards breach
this duty, it is also difficult to assess when courts have erred in enforc-
ing this duty.396  Assuming a rise in judicial errors, it would be very
hard to ascertain whether and to what extent directors were changing
their behavior as a result.  It is also unclear how costly such hypotheti-
cal errors would prove to be.397
Even assuming a court can reasonably accurately assess good faith
in a particular case, it is difficult to determine whether courts make
sufficient errors across the board to counterbalance any benefits,398
how readily judicial intervention deters risk taking,399 or whether an
expansive form of review would really prevent future corporate scan-
dals.400  Weighing such uncertain costs and benefits is guesswork.401
395. See, e.g., Gold, supra note 287, at 133 (“The fiduciary duty of good faith is a source R
of potential confusion.  This area of the law is still developing, and the doctrine may have
different meanings in different contexts.”); Veasey & Di Guglielmo, supra note 7, at 1452 R
(noting that good faith is an “amorphous concept”).
396. For discussion of the indeterminacy of what it means to act in the corporation’s
best interests, see supra notes 242–273 and accompanying text. R
397. There is good reason to think that even a small risk of error could be quite costly.
As Stephen Bainbridge suggests:
As long as there is some non-zero probability of erroneous second-guessing by
judges . . . the threat of liability will skew director decision making away from
optimal risk taking.  That this result will occur even if the risk of judicial error is
quite small is suggested by the work of behavioral economists on loss aversion and
regret avoidance.
Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 123.  Such costs would include not only harm to the particu- R
lar corporation and shareholders involved, but also any systemic effects as others react to
judicial error by changing future behavior.
398. Note that the existence of judicial error may be invisible to outside observers unfa-
miliar with the inner workings of the corporation.  The board may know better than
judges, or third parties, which decisions are in the best interests of the corporation, based
upon their firm-specific knowledge. See id. at 119 (noting that courts have “less informa-
tion about the specifics of the particular firm in question” than directors).
399. See Telman, supra note 21, at 16–18 (noting the dearth of empirical evidence un- R
derlying the concern that stricter judicial review would have a deleterious effect on direc-
tor risk-taking).
400. For example, directors might simply devote more time to camouflaging bad faith
conduct. See CLARK, supra note 278, at 137–38 (suggesting that, if courts did not usually R
prohibit shareholders from attempting to prove subjective motivations, knowledgeable
managers would “easily forestall all such challenges by couching all documentation about
corporate decisions in vague rhetoric about the corporation’s long-run interest”).
401. Vermeule notes with respect to judicial review under the Constitution that “[a]
persistent illusion among academics as well as judges is the faith that ‘I can have all the
invalidations I like and none of the ones I don’t’—a perfectionist faith that overlooks the
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Many of the costs and benefits, in other words, are matters of severe
uncertainty and perhaps ignorance.402
D. Applying Decision Theory to Determine the Standard of Review
Among the various uncertain variables, decision costs are a nota-
ble exception.403  It is possible for a court to assess the significance of
decision costs associated with corporate litigation.404  These costs in-
clude the costs of legal representation, prolonged discovery, and time
spent by the court that could be devoted to other cases.405  Courts
have an informational advantage here—they are in a position to wit-
ness these effects of legal doctrine.
In the context of shareholder derivative suits, the costs of litiga-
tion can be especially severe.  Even where claims are dubious, discov-
ery may disrupt normal corporate functions, create disastrous public
relations consequences, and force corporations to reveal their pro-
spective business plans.406  This is one justification for imposition of
fallibility of judicial institutions.” VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 281.  A parallel R
illusion may exist with respect to judicial review of business judgments.
402. As Lynn Stout explains:
Whether the social losses from shareholder primacy outweigh the social losses
from allowing greater director discretion is an extraordinarily complex question.
Moreover, the answer is likely to vary from firm to firm and from one historical
period to another.  Case studies, and even large longitudinal studies, may be of
limited value.
Stout, supra note 250, at 1201; see also Griffith, supra note 7, at 8 n.16 (noting, with respect R
to the dispute over the optimal balance of board discretion and judicial oversight, that “the
ultimate resolution of this debate depends on empirical evidence that currently does not
exist”).
403. See Telman, supra note 21, at 37 (“[T]he dynamics of shareholder derivative suits R
leads to settlements that benefit plaintiffs’ attorneys but not really the corporation or its
shareholders, who end up paying for the suit through higher insurance costs that the cor-
poration is forced to pay.” (footnote omitted)).
404. Cf. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 166 (“The elements of interpretive choice R
for which the judges’ informational advantage seems most pronounced are the costs of
adjudication and the effects of various interpretive rules on the judges’ caseloads—two
critical components of decision costs.”).
405. As Vermeule notes:
“Decision costs” is a broad rubric that might encompass the direct (out-of-pocket)
costs of litigation to litigants and the judicial bureaucracy, including the costs of
supplying judges with information needed to decide the case at hand and formu-
late doctrines to govern future cases; the opportunity costs of litigation to litigants
and judges (that is, the time spent on a case that could more profitably be spent
on other cases); and the costs to lower courts of implementing and applying doc-
trines developed at higher levels.
Id. at 166–67.
406. Cf. Telman, supra note 21, at 37 (suggesting that “the real purpose of the [Business R
Judgment] Rule today should not be to protect board members from liability but to pro-
tect them and the corporation from the dissipation of assets and reputational harm that
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tough pleading requirements: the expenses associated with corporate
litigation are not small by any measure.407
Courts can readily determine that there are sizable decision costs
associated with heightened judicial review of the board’s substantive
business decisions (or even review of the board’s decisionmaking
processes).  These added costs are an inevitable consequence of ex-
panded judicial review of business judgments.  Furthermore, legal
transition costs would be a near certainty under a regime of enhanced
judicial review, as the various actors would have to adjust their behav-
ior to respond to the new legal doctrine.408
Under the principle of insufficient reason, it is appropriate to
treat speculative costs and benefits as canceling out, while focusing on
those costs and benefits that the decisionmaker can know.  Once the
focus is on the known costs and benefits of a chosen standard of re-
view, the comparison between legal doctrines becomes manageable.
Rationality review bars recovery for almost all business judgment
litigation—only the most unthinkable board conduct gets past this
test.  In contrast, high decision costs are to be expected if courts start
permitting lawsuits alleging bad faith to proceed based on evidence
that the board’s conduct was in some sense unreasonable under the
circumstances.  The amorphous nature of good faith, not to mention
the subjective quality of the applicable evidence, are ideal for pro-
tracted litigation.
Similar difficulties arise if courts adopt a test that draws from fea-
tures of loyalty and care claims.  For example, in a recent draft article,
Claire Hill and Brett McDonnell suggest a sliding scale, where courts
would assess breaches of the duty of good faith by looking to two fac-
tors: evidence of structural bias and gross negligence in the decision-
making process.409  Risks of judicial error are certainly substantial in
results from litigation”); see also Ralph K. Winter, Paying Lawyers, Empowering Prosecutors, and
Protecting Managers: Raising the Cost of Capital in America, 42 DUKE L.J. 945, 948–52 (1993)
(describing the costs associated with shareholder derivative lawsuits).
407. See Winter, supra note 406, at 952 & n.29 (advocating strict pleading requirements R
for shareholder derivative suits and noting that Delaware’s demand requirement may per-
form this function).
408. For a useful analysis of legal transition costs, see Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of
Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV. 789 (2002).  If the business judgment rule is retained in its
standard form, the absence of transition costs is significant, as transition costs may counter-
balance decision costs in some cases where the principle of insufficient reason is applied.
See VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 266 (discussing the relevance of transition costs to R
changes in judicial review, particularly with respect to the principle of insufficient reason);
Eskridge, supra note 312, at 2054 (noting the significance of transition costs when assessing R
proposed changes to statutory interpretation).
409. See Hill & McDonnell, supra note 7, at 25. R
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this context, as are the potential effects on director risk-taking.  The
legal standard would not only be hard to predict ex ante, but poten-
tially quite variable from judge to judge.  Quite possibly, the effects of
their suggestion would be salutary, but the proposed change would be
significant and its systemic effects unknown.  The increase in decision
costs in comparison to rationality review, however, would be
substantial.
Vermeule identifies two conditions for applying the principle of
insufficient reason to institutional choices: “the decisionmaker ought
to have a pronounced informational advantage with respect to the
consideration that is given dispositive weight,” and “the deci-
sionmaker should be able to discern that the consideration given dis-
positive weight is, in some rough sense, of the same order of
importance as the discarded imponderables.”410
The decision costs of corporate litigation should be relatively well
known to the judiciary.  As far as orders of importance, these costs are
hardly trivial, and could plausibly outweigh the benefits offered by a
more involved judicial review of business judgments.  Consequently, it
is reasonable to select the traditional business judgment rule alloca-
tion of decisionmaking authority as a source of lower decision costs.
The maximin criterion also supports this conclusion.411  Assume
that increased judicial scrutiny does not function as planned; rather
than eliminate bad faith, directors simply devote more energy to hid-
ing their schemes.  A plausible worst-case scenario with heightened
judicial review of director decisions might resemble the following: En-
ron-style scandals occur with the same frequency as in prior years; ju-
dicial errors increase; desirable risk-taking is deterred; sizable
transition costs are incurred as parties adapt to the new regime; and
decision costs substantially increase.412
410. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 175. R
411. But cf. Eskridge, supra note 312, at 2054–57 (demonstrating different ways of R
describing worst-case scenarios in an interpretive choice context).  Eskridge argues that the
use of maximin for this type of problem is vulnerable to manipulation. See id. at 2057.
However, Eskridge’s argument has greater strength in the contexts he discusses, where a
substantial legal change, such as the decision to stop reviewing legislative history, is pro-
posed.  With a small number of exceptions among the Delaware precedents, the approach
described in this Article is supportive of the status quo.
412. In fact, if changes to the status quo were significant enough, some predict a truly
dire worst-case scenario.  Consider Chancellor Chandler’s assessment:
Should the Court apportion liability based on the ultimate outcome of decisions
taken in good faith by faithful directors or officers, those decision-makers would
necessarily take decisions that minimize risk, not maximize value.  The entire ad-
vantage of the risk-taking, innovative, wealth-creating engine that is the Delaware
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The worst-case scenario under the traditional business judgment
rule formulation would also be very undesirable and might involve
substantial board misconduct.  If we imagine the worst-case scenario
under Delaware’s business judgment rule standard, however, there
would naturally be no legal transition costs, and decision costs would
be lower than under the alternative.  A rational basis test has signifi-
cantly lower decision costs than heightened scrutiny.
All of the harms feared under a regime that strictly follows the
business judgment rule could realistically occur under a regime in
which courts review business judgments more closely.413  On this basis,
the high decision costs associated with corporate litigation should tip
the balance.  Of course, these worst-case scenarios may not occur.  But
there is as much reason to expect that a new doctrine will cause dam-
age as there is to think legal change would produce an improvement.
Courts are not in a position to weigh the highly uncertain effects
of a new allocation of board authority against the uncertain effects of
the business judgment rule.  Legitimate concerns exist for both
choices.  Until more empirical information is available, the foregoing
analysis is at least responsive to those factors that courts can assess.
E. The Broader Implications of a Decision Theory Approach
Importantly, decision cost considerations do not require the Del-
aware courts to resolve the shareholder primacy/director primacy de-
bate, nor do they require courts to definitively weigh optimal director
risk-taking against ideals of corporate governance.  Resolving those
debates is unnecessary.  The selection of a standard of review for good
faith claims invites an incompletely theorized agreement.
For each of the plausible normative commitments in corporate
law (for example, the various potential understandings of shareholder
wealth maximization, the team production model, and theories that
take the public interest into account), an increase in decision costs
would justify an allocation of primary decisionmaking authority to the
corporation would cease to exist, with disastrous results for shareholders and soci-
ety alike.
Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 698 (Del. Ch. 2005).  Whether or not one imagines a worst case of
quite the severity Chancellor Chandler describes, the potential for serious negative sys-
temic effects in this context should not be downplayed.
413. It is always possible that this Article has not successfully hypothesized the worst-case
scenarios.  Nonetheless, it is difficult to imagine a major harm which could plausibly occur
under the present legal regime that could not also occur under a case of expanded judicial
review in fiduciary duty litigation.  A significant increase in decision costs, on the other
hand, is associated with an expanded review of board conduct, but not with retaining the
status quo.
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board.  The business judgment rule permits a convergence on legal
doctrine, even though courts and commentators may disagree as to
the ends that doctrine should serve.
A possible rejoinder to this use of the principle of insufficient
reason and the maximin criterion is that the argument proves too
much.  Courts presently review board decisions under an exacting
standard in cases where directors engage in self-dealing.  One might
argue that courts could lower decision costs further if they abstained
from reviewing self-dealing cases.414  Indeed, if the sole criterion to
resolve this uncertainty of institutional choices is decision costs, a coin
flip might be an ideal decision method.415  The answer to these con-
cerns is to recognize that there are different degrees of uncertainty at
issue.
There are some empirical hunches that observers can comforta-
bly follow, despite the difficulties in directly testing their systemic ef-
fects.  To use Vermeule’s example: jurors should not be authorized to
hear cases involving close relatives.416  A similar assumption, shared by
commentators of various stripes, is that directors with a material con-
flict of interest are sufficiently dubious decisionmakers to merit closer
judicial review of their choices.417  Thus, the principle of insufficient
reason and the maximin approach need not require a radical restruc-
turing of corporate law.
Institutional analysis has a significant descriptive aspect.  From
the descriptive perspective, the above principles of judging under un-
certainty fit well with the typical judicial implementation of the busi-
ness judgment rule.  With the exception of outlier cases, courts tend
to review business judgments solely in cases where the uncertainties
that surround an optimal allocation of decisionmaking authority are
limited.
414. Cf. Gold, supra note 287, at 159–61 (describing how the elimination of fiduciary R
duties in limited liability corporation and limited partnership charters may serve to address
litigation risk and other business needs for certain parties).
415. But cf. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 196 (“The point of all this is not that R
decision costs should be minimized tout court.  If it were, judges might flip coins to decide
cases or simply close the courthouse doors.”); Eskridge, supra note 312, at 2053 (suggesting R
that, if inexpensive decisionmaking were an end in itself, “there would be no role for judi-
cial review of agency interpretations at all, or the role might be carried out by summary
opinions or even by flipping coins”).
416. VERMEULE, JUDGING, supra note 28, at 162–63. R
417. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 255, at 603–04 (“The business judgment rule . . . R
has no application where the board of directors is disabled by conflicted interests.  In such
cases, concern for director accountability trumps protection of their discretionary
authority.”).
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But as the foregoing discussion makes clear, there is also a pre-
scriptive aspect.  Prior to the Disney III chancery court opinion, there
was little Delaware precedent for holding directors liable absent a
showing of gross negligence in the decisionmaking process or a mate-
rial conflict of interest.418  In fact, the few cases in which allegations of
gross negligence alone enabled a plaintiff to rebut the business judg-
ment rule are outliers.419  Should courts lower the bar for claims of
bad faith, it would work a radical transformation of business judgment
rule doctrine.  Absent empirical support, this gamble is unwarranted.
VII. CONCLUSION
The duty of good faith will always be somewhat indeterminate.
Its case-specific nature requires reinterpretation for each new fact pat-
tern, and its legal content is largely dependent on the meaning of
other fiduciary duties.  However, the Delaware Supreme Court’s Dis-
ney V opinion goes a long way toward defining good faith conduct.  A
director breaches this obligation by intentionally or consciously disre-
garding her responsibility to act in the best interests of the corpora-
tion and its shareholders.420
The Disney V opinion is less helpful with respect to clarifying stan-
dards of review for courts that confront claims of director bad faith.
As a newly defined standard of conduct for fiduciaries—alongside the
conventional care and loyalty standards—good faith presents an op-
portunity to revise the scope of the business judgment rule.  Courts
might, if they so choose, use the duty of good faith to lower the re-
quirements for successful allegations of director misconduct.  To the
extent this occurs, it could dramatically alter a director’s risk of mone-
tary liability.
This possibility of limiting business judgment rule protections im-
plicates the proper balance between board accountability and board
authority.  It calls for a comparative institutional analysis.  Each institu-
418. Arguable exceptions where courts more closely scrutinize boards of directors in-
clude the unique contexts of corporate merger and takeover jurisprudence, as well as spe-
cial litigation committees.  In certain contexts, Delaware courts apply an intermediate
standard of review to board decisions. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946
(Del. 1985); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).  For helpful analysis of
these cases as a response to an increased risk of bias, see Hill & McDonnell, supra note 7, at
5–7.  In light of the apparent bias problems that these cases address, however, they may be
analogized to the more standard conflict of interest cases.
419. See Gevurtz, supra note 21, at 299 (noting the difficulty in finding cases in which the R
use of the gross negligence standard determined the outcome).
420. Disney V, 906 A.2d 27, 62, 67 (Del. 2006) (en banc).
\\server05\productn\M\MLR\66-2\MLR203.txt unknown Seq: 76 21-FEB-07 15:23
2007] DISNEY, GOOD FAITH, AND JUDICIAL UNCERTAINTY 473
tion—courts, directors, and shareholders—has strengths and weak-
nesses.  Even if boards do a poor job of looking out for corporate and
shareholder interests, it does not follow that courts would do a better
job.
Judicial errors may be common, and directors may become un-
duly risk-averse if they face sufficient liability.  But a greater role for
judicial oversight could encourage directors to take their responsibili-
ties more seriously and might protect shareholders from director mis-
conduct.  Courts must consider whether an increased judicial role will
serve the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders, or
whether most business judgments should be made by directors alone.
Regrettably, there is insufficient empirical data to make a well-
informed judgment about the ideal balance between board accounta-
bility and authority.  Factors such as rates of judicial error are nearly
impossible to measure, and the effects of liability risk on directors’
business judgments are hard to test.  Any improvements in director
behavior are also case-specific.  This lack of useful empirical support is
unlikely to be resolved in the near future, and could be with us for
years to come.  It is a trans-scientific problem.
Many of the effects of greater judicial involvement are matters of
conjecture, and there is little reason to think that one subjective judg-
ment on these questions is better than another.  Yet courts still have to
decide.  Since courts do not have the option of waiting for sufficient
empirical information, they must instead analyze the merits of the
business judgment rule under conditions of severe empirical uncer-
tainty.  Decision theory offers strategies for resolving this type of
uncertainty.
When choosing among legal alternatives, it is reasonable to as-
sume that uncertain costs and uncertain benefits will cancel out.  It is
also reasonable to minimize worst-case scenarios.  Applying these cri-
teria points toward preservation of conventional business judgment
rule protections.  The one sure effect of increased judicial involve-
ment in business judgment litigation is a substantial rise in litigation
costs.  The other effects of judicial oversight have long been subject to
debate—they may or may not occur under a new legal standard.
Without the necessary data, large costs and benefits from legal change
are equally plausible.
Ultimately, the business judgment rule is the most reasonable
choice under these conditions.  If board conduct is to be reviewed for
a lack of good faith, rationality review minimizes the high costs of cor-
porate litigation.  At the same time, it does not let directors off the
hook entirely.  Sufficiently outrageous board conduct will still result in
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liability, and directors with conflicts of interest must prove the entire
fairness of their actions.  This is admittedly a modest judicial role.
Perhaps the future will offer empirical findings that support a differ-
ent result.  Until that time, however, rationality review under the busi-
ness judgment rule is the best option available.
